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HARM, SEX, AND CONSEQUENCES
I. India Thusi*
Abstract
At a moment in history when this country incarcerates far too many
people, criminal legal theory should set forth a framework for
reexamining the current logic of the criminal legal system. This Article is
the first to argue that “distributive consequentialism,” which centers the
experiences of directly impacted communities, can address the harms of
mass incarceration and mass criminalization. Distributive
consequentialism is a framework for assessing whether criminalization is
justified. It focuses on the outcomes of criminalization rather than relying
on indeterminate moral judgments about blameworthiness, or “desert,”
which are often infected by the judgers’ own implicit biases. Distributive
consequentialism allows for consideration of both the harms of the
conduct and the harms of criminalization itself. It brings an intersectional
approach to criminal legal theory by examining the distribution of harm,
centering the experience of populations that face intersectional forms of
subordination, and viewing the criminal legal system suspiciously. This
Article adopts a distributive consequentialist analysis to examine the
continued criminalization of sex work as just one example of how the
theory can be applied. This application demonstrates how engaging in a
distributive consequentialist analysis is a step toward reining in a system
that seems to be ever-expanding and reframing a criminal legal theory
that has grown ambivalent about this expansion.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing consensus that the “War on Drugs” was a failure that
contributed to the massive expansion of the United States penal state.1 However, the
consequences of this drug war extend far beyond the context of increased penalties
for drug offenses.2 This War fostered a culture of punitiveness, which is apparent in
the influence of retribution and the abstract concept of “desert” within the U.S.
criminal legal system.3 This punitiveness has normalized the use of punishment as a
1

“Most criminal justice scholars agree that our current prison population is too large.
They also agree that the impact of imprisonment on the crime rate is modest and that the
speed at which people are released from prison bears little relation to the likelihood that they
will remain crime free.” Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be
Doing: Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 296 (2013) (citations
omitted). The failure of the War on Drugs is often described as the failure of punitive policies
to effectively control the use and sale of narcotics in this country, which have remained
consistent. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED
PUBLIC POLICY 64 (1990). The failure is also represented by the resultant expansion of the
criminal legal system that followed years of punitive policies. See Carol S. Steiker, Mass
Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2011)
(“[T]he fall in the rate of violent crimes and the acknowledged failure of the War on Drugs
has cast doubt on the necessity of imprisoning so many.”). The awareness about “mass
incarceration” was amplified following the release of Michelle Alexander’s influential book
The New Jim Crow. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (exploring how ostensibly
“colorblind” drug laws and law enforcement policies have resulted in the mass incarceration
of people of color). The proliferation of the term “mass incarceration” has become shorthand
for the United States’ dramatic increase in incarceration since the 1970s. During the same
period of time, there was a dramatic decrease in the violent crime rate. Id.
2
John Pfaff recently challenged the “stock story” that the War on Drugs led to mass
incarceration. See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION — AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (challenging the “stock
story” that incarceration increased as a result of punitive drug policies, and arguing that
criminal reformers should view the criminal legal system holistically and address the
punishment of violent crime). However, his argument does not properly consider the cultural
effects that a War on Drugs produces beyond the realm of drug enforcement. Politicians
adopted the language of punishment to address societal ills, including violence. Id. Policies
that might have actually addressed violence, such as restorative justice practices, were made
politically undesirable due to this tough-on-crime language. The War on Drugs promoted a
culture of punishment that instructed how we think about the work that the criminal legal
system should be doing. It legitimated an expanded role for prosecutors and signaled that
locking people up promotes public safety.
3
See Timothy Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in
the Criminal Justice System: The Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 283, 290 (2000)
(“Anchored by retributive ideals that insist on moral accountability, the once-fashionable
goal of rehabilitation has been supplanted by an ideological shift that emphasizes
incapacitation as a core value.”). The prominence of retribution in criminal legal theory
occurred at the same moment as the increase in incarceration in the United States:
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response to even minor social problems.4 It has had a devastating impact on women
and girls, fostering policies that use the punishment apparatus to “help” fallen
women, including sex workers.5
The legitimation of punishment as a tool for promoting social welfare is evident
in the criminalization and policing of prostitution.6 Policies that were developed as
part of the War on Drugs, such as “broken windows policing,” a policing strategy
that includes the use of stop and frisks and tickets for minor infractions, validated
the profiling and policing of cis and transgender women of color as sex workers.7
Notably, the renewed attention to desert in Anglo-American sentencing
theory coincided with the explosion of the United States prison population and
the imposition of increasingly severe sentences. Correlation is not causation, of
course, and desert theorists take pains to explain why they are not to blame for the
more severe sentences. But the coincidence of the resurgence in desert theory with
the rapid increase in sentence severity does suggest that, at the very least, desert
has failed as a limiting principle.
Alice G. Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 742 (2009).
4
See Darryl K. Brown, Decriminalization, Regulation, Privatization: A Response to
Professor Natapoff, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 14 (2016) (describing criminal
enforcement incentives that encourage “courts to punish rather than to warn, seek voluntary
cooperation, change norms, or address social problems and undesirable conduct in other
nonpunitive ways”).
5
Aya Gruber et al., Penal Welfare and the New Human Trafficking Intervention Courts,
68 FLA. L. REV. 1333, 1337, 1394 (2016) (describing “penal welfare” as “states’ growing
practice of providing social benefits through criminal court,” and warning that it “becomes
an add-on to a massive criminal system that has been legitimized precisely because it reflects
individualist ethics of responsibility instead of principles of distributive justice. The danger,
then, is that the more states and localities invest in penal welfare, the less that welfare,
services, and aid bound not to arrest and prosecution—but redistribution—can gain
legitimacy and secure funding.”).
6
See Cynthia Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1313, 1313–14
(2015) (describing how the criminalization of prostitution for minors with a protectionist
rationale is pretextual moralism).
7
Andrea Ritchie describes the connection between broken windows policing and the
policing of sex and gender:
This racialized policing of gender and sexuality is facilitated by the current
dominant “broken windows” policing paradigm, which posits that any perceived
social “disorder”—from a broken window to a group of young people hanging out
on a corner, to manifestations of racialized gender disorder like street-based
prostitution—must immediately be stamped out before it inevitably leads to
anarchy and chaos. Rooted in Black Codes and vagrancy laws, repackaged and
redeployed as “order maintenance” policing, implementation of “broken
windows” theory is characterized by aggressive and discriminatory enforcement
of so-called “quality of life” regulations which criminalize an ever expanding
range of public activities.
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Women of color in cities like New York, New Orleans, and Las Vegas report that
police profile them as prostitutes, and many have been arrested and processed
through the system. 8 These women have been deemed “blameworthy” by the
enforcers of the criminal legal system.9 Women have become the fastest growing
prison population,10 and one study has noted that 30 percent of incarcerated women
have prostitution-related convictions.11 Women’s experiences of mass incarceration
occur in these everyday interactions with the criminal legal system that are often
ignored.12
Despite discriminatory policing and criminalization, the theory on punishment
and criminalization is often ambivalent about the harms of criminalization itself and
has ignored how our approach to criminalization uniquely impacts women.13 Some
Andrea J. Ritchie, Crimes Against Nature: Challenging Criminalization of Queerness and
Black Women’s Sexuality, 14 LOY. J. PUB. IN’T L. 355, 369 (2013) (citations omitted); see
also Rima Vesely-Flad, New York City Under Siege: The Moral Politics of Policing
Practices, 1993-2013, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 898 & n.56 (2014) (describing how
profiling by police has led to humiliating experiences and sexual harassment, particularly for
transgender women).
8
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN HARM’S WAY: STATE RESPONSE TO SEX
WORKERS, DRUG USERS, AND HIV IN NEW ORLEANS 43–45 (2013) (describing the profiling
and harassment experience by transgender women in New Orleans).
9
See Godsoe, supra note 6, at 1360.
10
Stephen J. Tripodi & Carrie Pettus-Davis, Histories of Childhood Victimization and
Subsequent Mental Health Problems, Substance Use, and Sexual Victimization for a Sample
of Incarcerated Women in the US, 36 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 30, 30 (2013).
11
See generally DOROTHY WOOD, NAT’L COAL. FOR JAIL REFORM, WOMEN IN JAIL 9
(1982) (reviewing literature on women in jail to assess demographic data). Another study
found that approximately 26% of mothers whose children were placed in foster care in New
York in 1991 had prostitution convictions. MIRIAM EHRENSAFT ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, PATTERNS OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION AND INCARCERATION AMONG MOTHERS OF
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE IN NEW YORK CITY 11 (2003).
12
See generally KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW & ANDREA J. RITCHIE, AFR. AM.
POL’Y F., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2015),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/55a810d7e4b058f342f
55873/1437077719984/AAPF_SMN_B [https://perma.cc/4VBS-ZLBX] (responding to the
lack of action about police violence toward black women through a campaign centered on
black women’s experience of police violence).
13
Robert Weisberg has argued that criminal legal theorists have failed to rigorously
address the connection between theories of punishment, and related theories of
criminalization and mass incarceration:
Over the past decade, the humanities and social sciences have yielded
substantial literature examining the rise of mass incarceration from various
perspectives, ranging from econometric analyses of contributory factors to
cultural critiques of American exceptionalism in penal policy. At the same time,
in an oddly parallel but disconnected universe, legal and academic commentators
have continued their long engagement in jurisprudential debates about the
purposes of punishment (retribution, general and specific deterrence,
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scholars claim we are in a retributivists’ moment in criminal legal theory, examining
different aspects of retribution as a justification for punishment.14 These scholars
argue that morality-based justifications for punishment should continue to play a
role in justifying criminalization, analyzing the meaning of “just desert.”15 While
many criminal legal scholars have discussed the issue of “overcriminalization,”16
arguing that we have “too many crimes” or too much power vested in prosecutorial
offices, 17 few argue that we should reexamine our theories of punishment and
criminalization to address the mass incarceration and mass criminalization18 crisis.19
incapacitation, and rehabilitation). But mass incarceration has barely registered
in these debates. Perhaps the key irony about this disconnected parallelism is that
the dominant theme in these jurisprudential debates in the academic world has
been a robust revival of retributivism, the very rationale for punishment most
associated with the specific legal changes of recent decades that are the most
obvious causes of the great increase in incarceration. Indeed, even the many new
robust critiques of modern retributivism have only barely addressed the social
costs created by U.S. penal policy over the past four decades.
Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203,
1203–04 (2012) (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
14
Id.
15
Just desert refers to the extent to which a defendant “deserves” to be punished. See
MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 754 (1997)
(arguing that “all and only moral wrongs should be prohibited by the criminal law”). “For a
retributivist, the moral responsibility of an offender . . . gives society the duty to punish.” Id.
16
See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249–364
(1968); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 17, 17
(1968); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001) (“American criminal law, federal and state, is very broad; it covers far more
conduct than any jurisdiction could possibly punish. The federal code alone has thousands
of criminal prohibitions covering an enormous range of behavior, from the heinous to the
trivial. State codes are a little narrower, but not much. And federal and state codes alike are
filled with overlapping crimes, such that a single criminal incident typically violates a half
dozen or more prohibitions.”).
17
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2568 (2004).
18
Devon Carbado has defined “mass criminalization” as the “criminalization of
relatively nonserious behavior or activities and the multiple ways in which criminal justice
actors, norms, and strategies shape welfare state processes and policies.” Devon W. Carbado,
Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479,
1487 (2016).
19
William J. Stuntz, Reply: Criminal Law’s Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828, 829
(2002) [hereinafter Stuntz, Reply] (“Theories of punishment matter, but their largest effect is
on sentencing practices, not on criminal liability rules.”). Stuntz noted that the theories of
punishment have been constant, but the incarceration has not. Id. at 835–56. The
incarceration rate dramatically increased during the 1970s and 1980s, and Stuntz suggested
that this illustrates the lack of connection between a theory of punishment and incarceration.
Id. However, he failed to examine the relationship between the rise of retributivism and the
social and political backlash to the expansion of civil rights for African Americans during
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Even fewer argue that we should completely reimagine how we think about the
related issues of what conduct is worthy of being treated as a crime and whether
punishment is justified for that conduct, let alone how these theories impact distinct
communities. By contrast, other disciplines have not only internalized mass
incarceration, but they have also set forth various strategies for addressing it.20
At a moment in history when this country incarcerates far too many people,21
criminal legal theory should set forth a framework for examining the current logic
and justifications of the criminal legal system. This Article argues that distributive
the same period of time. Id. Critical race theorists have posited that the Reagan era and focus
on mass criminalization was an effort to control black and brown people. See Anthony Cook,
The Ghosts of 1964: Race, Reagan, and the Neo-Conservative Backlash to the Civil Rights
Movement, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 81, 82 (2015) (“With the election of Ronald Reagan
in 1980, the forces that would shape a sustained backlash against the gains of the civil rights
movement were already in play: party realignment and the re-emergence of the religious
right in American politics; the rise of a ‘law and order’ movement that would morph into a
‘war on drugs’ movement fueling the mass incarceration of Black and Hispanic men, women,
and children . . . . Taken together, these converging forces not only undermined the dream
of racial equality promised by America’s Second Reconstruction but threatened democracy
itself . . . .”).
20
Political scientist Marie Gottschalk has argued that legal education can be blamed
for the recent rise in incarceration in the United States, arguing that “[d]ifferences in the legal
training, professional norms, and career paths of prosecutors, judges, and other judicial
administrators are another reason why the U.S. criminal justice system has been more
vulnerable to political winds whipped up by politicians and social movements . . . .” MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN
AMERICA 98 (2006).
21

Radical changes in crime control and sentencing policies led to an unprecedented
buildup of the United States prison population over the last thirty years. By the
end of 2002, the number of inmates in the nation’s jails and prisons exceeded two
million. Today’s imprisonment rate is five times as high as in 1972 and surpasses
that of all other nations. The sheer scale and acceleration of U.S. prison growth
has no parallel in western societies. As David Garland put it, ‘This is an
unprecedented event in the history of the USA and, more generally, in the history
of liberal democracy.’
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004) (citations omitted). And, mass
incarceration has disproportionately impacted black and brown communities:
A host of empirical studies conducted in the last decade explore the nature of these
effects on the African American survivors of mass imprisonment. They find that
incarceration has become a systemic aspect of community members’ family
affairs, economic prospects, political engagement, social norms, and childhood
expectations for the future.
Id. at 1277.
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consequentialism is a theoretical framework for analyzing whether minor crimes
should be criminalized and justifying the decriminalization of many of these crimes.
Instead of abstract notions of “desert” and retribution, the criminal legal system
should focus on improving actual outcomes, especially where there is no obvious
victim of the would-be crime. The implicit biases of criminal justice actors have a
way of creeping into the process when such actors must make determinations based
on the blameworthiness and morality of the offenders. Criminal legal theorists
should embrace a form of consequentialism, a utilitarian theory focused on the
results of conduct that cares about actual outcomes but distributive in analyzing
whether the outcomes are fairly distributed.22 Distributive consequentialism avoids
moral judgments and assesses criminalization and punishment by evaluating the
harms of the conduct as well as the troubles of criminalization.23 It is a step toward
reining in a system that seems to be ever-expanding, and reframing the criminal legal
theory that has grown ambivalent about this expansion.24
This Article applies the distributive consequentialist framework to examine
whether prostitution should remain criminalized. While both abolitionist and prosex-work feminist scholars have debated sex work extensively, distributive
consequentialism provides a normative framework for examining crimes, even
outside the prostitution context. 25 There are also serious gaps in the feminist
literature in this area. In the areas of rape law and employment discrimination,
feminist theory has successfully improved the outcomes for the women it seeks to
protect. 26 However, in the peculiar area of vice crimes, feminist theory has the
22

See generally Vincent Chiao, Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment, 11
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 431 (2017) (discussing the flaws of a retributivist theory in light of the
collective social harms that stem from mass incarceration).
Theories of punishment that are at least open to considerations of social cost
can appeal to a broader range of inputs in estimating nMAX [an estimated maximum
permissible rate of incarceration]. They can, for instance, consider the expected
aggregate costs of incarceration—the harms imposed directly on those
incarcerated, the collateral consequences on families and communities, and the
opportunity costs to society of time wasted languishing in prison—as well as its
expected benefits, such as the reduction in criminal offending and the vindication
of the rights of victims.
Id. at 438.
23
See infra Part III.
24
See id.
25
See generally I. India Thusi, Radical Feminist Harms on Sex Workers, 22 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185 (2018) (discussing feminist debates regarding the legal treatment of sex
work and arguing that the radical feminist approach to sex work is itself a form of
subordination of women).
26
There is scholarly debate about the use of effectiveness of punishment to promote a
feminist agenda. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New
Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES 128, 143 (2007) (defining “carceral feminism” as “the
commitment of abolitionist feminist activists to a law and order agenda and, as Marie
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unintended result of stigmatizing “fallen women” and illustrating the proverbial
tension between the middle-class white feminists, who are often (albeit implicitly)
idealized in feminist scholarship, and the demonized poor, colored women.27 This
tension is especially evident when considering the experiences of sex workers of
color, whose victim status is selectively exploited by some feminist scholars, but
whose voices are systemically silenced when it does not fit the narrative of sex
worker as victim and trafficking survivor.28 This Article considers the harms that
this class of sex workers’ experiences from any form of criminalization, including
partial criminalization, and begins to examine how intersectionality looks within the
context of criminal legal theory.29 Criminal justice reformers can easily adopt the
Gottschalk has similarly described within the context of the U.S. antirape and battered
women’s movements, a drift from the welfare state to the carceral state as the enforcement
apparatus for feminist goals.”).
27
Kamala Kempadoo, Women of Color and the Global Sex Trade: Transnational
Feminist Perspectives, 1 MERIDIANS 28, 40 (2001) (noting that “insights, knowledges, and
understandings of sex work have been largely obscured or dominated by white radical
feminist, neo-Marxist, or Western socialist feminist inspired analyses that have been either
incapable or unwilling to address the complexities of the lives of women of color.”).
28
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431,
448 (2016) (suggesting sex work is coercive while making several empirical claims about
the nature of sex work, and stating “women are disproportionately bought and sold in
prostitution by men as a cornerstone of combined economic, racial, age-based, and gendered
inequality, in which money functions as a form of force in sex because the women are not
permitted to survive any other way”).
29
Some critical theorists who are concerned with intersectionality have convincingly
identified the unique harms that women with intersectional identities experience within the
criminal legal system. See, e.g., Priscilla A. Ocen, (E)racing Childhood: Examining the
Racialized Construction of Childhood and Innocence in the Treatment of Sexually Exploited
Minors, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1586, 1593 (2015) (discussing the “overpolicing and under
protection of sexually exploited girls of color”).
During this formative period, social institutions function to protect children
from adults who would seek to harm or misuse them. For many children, however,
childhood is fraught with exploitation and sexual abuse. These children are often
targeted by pimps, who exploit their bodies for commercial gain. Commonly
decried as a modern form of slavery, children across the country are caught in this
tragic cycle of sexual abuse and trauma. Far too often, however, sexually
exploited children are not recognized as victims, despite their inability to consent
to a sexual act, instead they are subject to prosecution for juvenile prostitution.
Id. at 1588. Where these theorists fall short is through their adoption of an over-generalized
victim narrative that disempowers the very women they seek to empower, painting with
broad brush strokes the experiences that women of color in the sex trade experience. This
approach is understandable because they are trying to ensure that these women receive equal
protection of the law. However, they often rely upon unreliable tropes about the experience
of women in the sex trade; they often seek to expand the criminal legal apparatus, an
instrument of the subordination of women of color; and they reinforce patriarchal views
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framework in this Article to analyze the criminalization of other crimes, including
the use and sale of heroin, sexual vices, or other offenses.
Part I of this Article argues that the retributivist approach that is dominant in
criminal law produces inequality and inevitably reflects privileged understandings
of morality and blameworthiness. Part II discusses how mass incarceration is an
indicator of disfunction within the criminal legal system and how our retributivist
approach to criminalization contributes to racially discriminatory outcomes. Part III
discusses distributive consequentialism, which is a theory of criminalization that
empowers the community most affected by criminal legal interventions and focuses
on the actual consequences of criminalization in addition to the consequences of the
underlying conduct. Part IV applies this approach to the criminalization of sex work
and argues that this theory is particularly useful when evaluating the treatment of
vice crimes although the theory is relevant to the project of decarceration more
broadly.
I. THE MOVE FROM UTILITARIANISM TO RETRIBUTION
The appropriateness of criminal punishment is central to understanding the role
of the criminal legal system within society.30 “As an arbiter of social conflict and a
guarantor of civic status, criminal law is necessarily also a potentially powerful
weapon of subordination.” 31 Often the purpose of the criminal legal system is
presumed to be insignificant to the actual functioning of the system.32 However,
understanding the goals of punishment, and relatedly, criminalization, is critical to
about women’s experiences with sex and the sex trade. See Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing
Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and
Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1658–59 (2010) (discussing the “reductive” narrative of
prostitutes as trafficking victims as an oversimplification that ignores other exploitive labor
practices in the majority of trafficking cases and places ideology above empirical data). This
Article seeks to make criminal legal theory more intersectional by recognizing these
women’s experiences. But, it is realist in that criminal legal theory is more likely to inflict
greater harms into these women’s lives that should be avoided at all costs.
30
Punishment theory is central to the logic of criminalization. Much of the discourse
about whether conduct should be criminalized focuses on the purposes of punishment,
including general or specific deterrence as well as the blameworthiness of the offender, or
desert. Accordingly, while this Article is concerned whether conduct should be criminalized
at all, punishment theory remains a central consideration in making this evaluation. See
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Theory and Criminal Justice Practice, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
73, 74–76 (2012) (highlighting how criminal law theory has been focused on the debates of
retributivist and consequentialist justification for punishments, which encompass questions
of criminalization and enforcement as well as punishment); see also Stuntz, supra note 16,
at 506 (“[C]riminal law does not drive criminal punishment. It would be closer to the truth
to say that criminal punishment drives criminal law.”).
31
Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, What Is Criminal Law About?, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1173, 1175 (2016).
32
See Stuntz, Reply, supra note 19, at 829 (“Theories of punishment matter, but their
largest effect is on sentencing practices, not on criminal liability rules.”).
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assessing whether the system is functioning as it should function.33 How can one
know whether the criminal legal system is meeting its goals if there is no real clarity
on what those goals are? These mixed goals contributed to the cultural environment
in which politicians adopted harsh criminal policies; they provided the rationale for
expanding the criminal system; and they legitimized the incentives and disfunction
that has led to mass incarceration.
A. Theories of Criminalization
The purpose of criminalization has long been debated by scholars from Jeremy
Bentham34 and John Stuart Mill,35 to Lord Devlin,36 H. L. A. Hart,37 Joel Feinberg,38
and Paul Robinson.39 These debates have explored the moral and legal justifications
for criminalization and punishment. Debates about criminalization are closely
connected to debates about punishment because punishment is central to
understanding whether the State is justified in criminalizing certain conduct. 40
Criminalization asks—does a particular act warrant punishment to protect people

33

See Brown, supra note 30, at 74–76 (highlighting how criminal law theory has been
focused on the debates of retributivist and consequentialist justification for punishments,
which encompass questions of criminalization and enforcement as well as punishment).
34
See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 1–7 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1879) (1789).
35
See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 86–109 (The Floating Press 2009)
(1859).
36
Lord Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 639 (1962)
(arguing that for the legislator, the “morals which he enforces are those ideas about right and
wrong which are already accepted by the society for which he is legislating and which are
necessary to preserve its integrity.”).
37
H.L.A. Hart, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 46 (1963) (“The fundamental objection
[of legal moralists] is surely that a right to be protected from the distress which is inseparable
from the bare knowledge that others are acting in ways you think wrong, cannot be
acknowledged by anyone who recognizes individual liberty as a value.”); see also Ronald
Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 994 (1966) (“[O]ur
conventional moral practices are more complex and more structured than he takes them to
be, and that he consequently misunderstands what it means to say that the criminal law
should be drawn from public morality.”).
38
JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in A READER ON
PUNISHMENT 73, 75–76 (Anthony Duff & David Garland eds., 1994).
39
Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the
Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1566 (2017).
40
See, e.g., Vanessa E. Munro, Book Review, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 314, 323–26
(2009) (reviewing DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (2008)) (explaining Husak’s theory that overcriminalization and overpunishment have become widespread and arguing that individuals have a basic right not to
be punished). In situations meeting a certain set of criteria, that right may be legitimately
infringed by the state, but where the criteria is not met, punishment is unjustified and the
right not to be punished is intolerably violated. Id.

2019]

HARM, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES

169

and property given the purposes and limits of punishment?41 While it is at times
difficult to draw a bright line between punishment and criminalization because of
their close relationship, this Article primarily focuses on the question of
criminalization given the justifications for punishment.
One of the dominant approaches to punishment and criminalization is
utilitarianism.42 Jeremy Bentham provided the initial philosophical foundations for
the utilitarian approach to criminal law.43 Bentham was concerned with the “greatest
happiness for the greatest number.”44 Under this approach, punishment is justifiable
where it increases net societal happiness. 45 John Stuart Mill refined Bentham’s
utilitarianism and argued for a utilitarian approach to criminal law that is concerned
with the common good, and originated the “harm principle,” which is a limiting
principle that supports criminalization where there is “harm to others.”46
H. L. A. Hart repopularized the harm principle during his debate with Lord
Devlin regarding the appropriateness of criminalizing “immoral” conduct,
particularly sodomy and prostitution.47 Hart argued that the harm principle provides
a normative basis for excluding government intervention where there is no “harm to
others.”48 The harm principle is a limiting principle because it provides guidance for
limiting government intervention into private affairs: Government intervention is
limited to those situations where there is “harm to others.”49 However, as Bernard
Harcourt describes in great detail, H. L. A. Hart and Joel Feinberg reduced this
principle to “harm to others,” which ultimately prevailed over legal moralistic
arguments in the debates with Lord Devlin, but later ushered in a phase where harm
was used to advocate for additional state regulation rather than limit state

41

Id.
See generally Matthew Haist, Deterrence in A Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian
Goals Achievable in A World of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
789 (2009) (describing the continued relevance of utilitarianism).
43
See BENTHAM, supra note 34; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Mill Between Aristotle
& Bentham, 133 DAEDALUS 60, 61–62, 65–66 (2004) (discussing Mill’s further
development of Bentham’s theory and refinement of the concept of happiness).
44
See generally Ruut Veenhoven, Greater Happiness for a Greater Number: Is that
Possible and Desirable?, 11 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 605 (2010) (questioning whether
Bentham’s principle of greatest happiness is achievable).
45
See BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 3–4.
46
See MILL, supra note 35, at 160 (“[T]here are many acts which, being directly
injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done
publicly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences
against others, may rightly be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency; on which
it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our subject,
the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves
condemnable, nor supposed to be so.”).
47
See Hart, supra note 37, at 13–17.
48
See id.
49
See id.
42
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interventions upon individual liberty.50 Activists and advocates have adopted harmbased arguments to secure additional government intervention. 51 In other words,
harm is no longer a shield; it is a sword.52 The argument goes that the conduct in
question should be criminalized because there is harm involved.53 This is a different
point of departure than prohibiting government intervention unless there is harm to
others. It is premised on the utility of criminalization rather than a desire to limit
additional government intervention. 54 Nevertheless, the tendency to use harm to
advocate for the expansion of government intervention can be disrupted by adopting
a presumption against criminalization.55
In general, a utilitarian approach to criminal punishment considers the goals of
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.56 However, rehabilitation has become
a distant third in the utilitarian equation. “After 1968, the liberal rehabilitative ideal,
which dominated postwar penal and criminal justice theory and practice in the
United States, was replaced increasingly by an ideology of crime prevention through
incapacitation and retribution as a goal of criminal sentencing.”57 Accordingly, the
utilitarian calculus has been primarily focused on deterrence and incapacitation,

50

See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 129–34 (1999) (arguing that the harm principle as a limiting
principle of criminalization has effectively collapsed under the weight of arguments to
employ “harm” as a justification for additional punishment).
51
Id. at 139–40.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 113–14.
55
See infra Part III.
56
Federal law highlights several of the factors that are relevant in a utilitarian approach
to punishment:
(a) Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.—The court shall
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
...
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
...
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
...
(7) The need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
57
Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How
the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94
GEO. L.J. 1385, 1410 (2006).
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which is a narrow conception of the utilitarian goals that could be beneficial to a
community.
B. Retribution Creates a Culture of Punishing
While the language of the Model Penal Code and several sentencing guidelines
adopt some utilitarian terms,58 they also include decidedly retributivist language.59
In fact, retributivism has become the leading approach to punishment and
criminalization.60 Retributivism was largely abandoned during much of the 1900s in
favor of a utilitarian approach to criminalization.61 However, the retributivist model
enjoyed a resurgence starting in the early 1970s:
Retributivism is all the rage. Whether it is a “revival,” a “resurgence,”
or a “renaissance,” retributivism’s rapid “rise” since the early 1970s has
been remarkable. The U.S. Supreme Court, state courts, state legislatures,
philosophers, and legal scholars alike are increasingly acknowledging
retributivism as the dominant theory of punishment. Even its critics
58
See Press Release, Am. Law Inst., Model Penal Code: Sentencing Approved (May
24,
2017),
https://www.ali.org/news/articles/model-penal-code-sentencing-approved/
[https://perma.cc/SD8E-LAYJ] (explaining that the recently revised version of the Model
Penal Code’s sentencing provisions includes language about the purpose of the criminal legal
system.); see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017):

(2) The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all
official actors in the sentencing system, are:
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders:
(i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity
proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders;
(ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation,
general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restitution to crime
victims, preservation of families, and reintegration of offenders into the lawabiding community, provided these goals are pursued within the boundaries of
proportionality in subsection (a)(i);
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the
applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) . . . .
59

Id. The goal in § (2)(a)(ii) of the revised Model Penal Code adopts utilitarian terms,
while the language in § (2)(a)(i) is retributivist. Id.
60
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845–48 (2002).
61
See Mark A. Michael, Utilitarianism and Retributivism: What’s the Difference?, 29
AM. PHIL. Q. 173, 173 (1992) (“During most of this century utilitarian considerations
dominated the discussion of the justification of punishment.”); see also David Dolinko,
Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623 nn.1–2 (1992).
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acknowledge that retributivism “can fairly be regarded as the leading
philosophical justification for the institution of criminal punishment.”
...
[R]etributivism justifies punishment, or the suffering by the
punished, not on any actual good consequences that might be attained, but
solely because the punished deserve it.62
Public statements about the criminal legal system as incarceration increased,
reflecting a turn toward retributivism and punishing people because they “deserved”
to be punished.63 Assigning blame and punishment for social ills is central to the
logic of retributivism. “The idea of desert is central to retributive theory . . . . Desert
is a moral concept, not a legal one.”64 Retributivist theory has contributed to a culture
of using punishment to remedy all that is wrong with society.65 The expanding list
of offenses between 1980 and 2010 and the increase in harsh sentencing laws suggest
that the desire to punish for the sake of punishment explains, at least in part, the
rapid increase in incarceration during this time period. 66 Political scientist Mark
Ramirez employed an error-correction model to measure aggregate public support

62

Christopher, supra note 60 (citations omitted).
See Craig Haney, Politicizing Crime and Punishment: Redefining “Justice” to Fight
the “War on Prisoners,” 114 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 393–94 (2012) (“As politicians succeeded
in raising the overall level of fear and anger over crime, and capitalizing on the ‘tough on
crime’ policies they offered in response, there was increasingly hostile public reaction to any
criminal justice policies that smacked of leniency or restraint (no matter how promising or
effective).”); see also Amanda Kay, The Agony of Ecstasy: Reconsidering the Punitive
Approach to United States Drug Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2133, 2133–34 (2002):
63

Tom Campbell, a congressman from California, commented on this phenomenon:
‘The most common reaction I get from my colleagues is “You’re absolutely right,
but, boy, I’m not going to take that risk.”’ While the public is decreasingly
supportive of punitive laws, many still cling to the belief that such laws will
reduce drug use because of fear—fear that drug use among children will increase
and that less stringent drug laws will lead to moral decline and empower minority
groups.
Id. (citations omitted).
64
Leigh Goodmark, The Punishment of Dixie Shanahan: Is There Justice for Battered
Women Who Kill?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 269, 290 (2007).
65
See Kay, supra note 63, at 2138.
66
See Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the CounterMajoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2014) (“With President
Reagan’s official declaration of the war on drugs in 1982, America began an unprecedented
experiment with mass incarceration.” (citations omitted)).
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for punitive criminal justice policies from 1951 to 2006.67 He found that the punitive
sentiment spiked in the 1970s, and again in the 1990s.68

Figure 1. Punitiveness Sentiment69
At the same time, the United States penal population increased by six times.70
Between 1925 and 1975, the prison incarceration rate remained constant at 100 per
100,000 of the resident population. 71 That rate increased to 472 per 100,000 by
2001.72 This expansion of the criminal legal system is not restricted to the number
of people sitting in prisons and jails. It has been an expansion of the entire criminal
legal system, including expansive policing practices as reflected in increased arrests,
more citations for low-level offenses, and an increased number of people under
surveillance through entry into gang databases, predictive crime strategies, and

67

See Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 329 (2013).
Id. at 337–38; see also Matthew B. Kugler et al., Differences in Punitiveness Across
Three Cultures: A Test of American Exceptionalism in Justice Attitudes, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1104 (2013) (“The large differences between American and Canadian
approaches to justice issues do not appear to be solely or even primarily rooted in the attitudes
of their citizenry.”).
69
LOREN SIEGEL, TRANSFORMING THE SYSTEM, A NEW SENSIBILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
10 (2016), https://transformingthesystem.org/criminal-justice-policy-solutions/publicopinion-report-a-new-sensibility/findings-americans-are-becoming-less-punitive/
[https://perma.cc/AAB6-XQ6Y].
70
Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 151, 151 (2004).
71
Id. at 152.
72
Id.
68
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sorting through the misdemeanor court system.73 The incarcerated population grew
to 2.2 million people with the total correctional population at 7.1 million people by
2005.74 By 2008, the U.S. incarceration rate was 762 per 100,000 nearly eight times
its historic average.75

Figure 2. Incarceration Rate76
The rise in incarceration and criminalization reflects a dramatic shift in policy.77
The rhetoric of retributivism focuses on punishment for the sake of punishment.78
While some scholars argue that drug crimes only amount to a small number of
individuals currently incarcerated in prisons and jails throughout the country, the
narrative during the “War on Drugs” era fueled a penchant for punitiveness that is

73

Id. at 153.
Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the Future of
Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 858–59 (2009).
75
Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8,
9 (2010).
76
Michael Mitchell, The Causes and Costs of High Incarceration Rates, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Oct. 29, 2014, 1:12 PM),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/the-causes-and-costs-of-high-incarceration-rates [https://perma.
cc/7PBP-VKQK].
77
Id. (“Incarceration rates have risen mainly because states are sending a much larger
share of offenders to prison and keeping them there longer — two factors under policymakers’
direct control. Reforms to reduce prison populations will need to target these two areas.”).
78
Haist, supra note 42, at 793–94 (“Retributivism posits that punishment is necessary
because society must engage in some form of retribution against those who violate its
laws. Its central tenet defines punishment as society’s response to a criminal action that has
occurred in the past. The value of the punishment of the crime is in the punishment
itself; when someone has committed a crime, they simply deserve to be punished.” (citations
omitted)).
74
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reflected in other parts of the criminal legal system. 79 It created a culture of
punishment. 80 The turn to retributivism has resulted in absurd outcomes where
systemic actors are working to preserve and expand their roles with the
dysfunctional system, to the detriment of economic interests and well-being of the
community. After all, incarceration is costly and is the least efficient manner to
encourage community safety.81 It costs an average of $31,286 to incarcerate one
person per year,82 yet only $9,410 for one year of in-state college tuition at a public
four-year college. 83
The incarceration punishment is largely motivated by retributivist goals. The
utilitarian aims of incapacitation and deterrence cannot justify this increase in
incarceration. The research shows that incarceration cannot explain the decrease in
violent crime, and “high levels of incarceration provide scant public safety
benefit.”84 Mass incarceration does not meet the utilitarian goals of deterrence or
incapacitation. Young people are the most likely offenders for violent crimes, yet
they are the least likely to be deterred from engaging in crime due to lengthy prison
sentences.85 Access to quality education and economic opportunity is more effective
at decreasing the violent crime rate.86 Punishing people for being bad or doing bad—
retribution—is a more probable explanation for the expansion of the surveillance
and incarceration that followed the War on Drugs. The chart below illustrates that
increased incarceration and changes in policing strategies played only a minor role
in decreasing crime.

79

See, e.g., Scott Holmes, Resisting Arrest and Racism — The Crime of “Disrespect”,
85 UMKC L. Rev. 625, 627–28 (2017) (discussing how charges of disrespect and resisting
arrest are an extension of the War on Drugs and racial control).
80
Id.
81
CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 9–13 (2012) (“A growing body of
research suggests . . . that beyond a certain point, further increases in incarceration have
significantly diminishing returns as a means of making communities safer.”).
82
Id. at 9.
83
College Costs: FAQs, BIG FUTURE, https://bigfuture.collegeboard.org/pay-forcollege/college-costs/college-costs-faqs [https://perma.cc/HBU2-ES4F]. This figure does
not include room and board.
84
OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME
DECLINE? 2 (2015).
85
See Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option,
95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 45 (2009) (“If adolescents tend to act impulsively or with little thought,
they can be seen as both less deterrable and less culpable.”).
86
See Shristi Devu, Comment, Trapped in the Shackles of America’s Criminal Justice
System, 20 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 217, 236 (2017).
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Figure 3. Factors Contributing to the Decrease in Crime87
Yet, the focus on assessing blameworthiness and desert has legitimized the use
of punishment against the “bad guys.” The increased focus on retribution was
presumably a response to a drug epidemic, intended to reduce the harms of the
crimes associated with crack cocaine. Drug dealers were deemed worthy of
punishment as a matter of morality. However, mass criminalization has exacerbated
those harms. It has created an entire caste of citizens who are denied the full rights
of citizenship but are expected to meet the full obligations of being a citizen, such
as paying taxes and paying child support.88 It was seemingly driven by a thirst to
crack down on the criminal drug dealer and put him in his place.89 It reflects a turn
87

See OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, W HAT CAUSED THE CRIME
DECLINE 6 (2015).
88
See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 354 (2012) (“Interestingly, child support
debt has recently emerged as a specific obstacle to re-enfranchisement, as is demonstrated in
Johnson v. Bredesen, wherein the Sixth Circuit upheld a Tennessee statute that authorizes an
exception to re-enfranchisement when petitioners are not current in child support obligations.”
(citations omitted)).
89
See Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America?, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
242, 252 (1991):
In 1971 President Richard Nixon called drug traffic “public enemy number one.”
Around the same time New York, under Governor Nelson Rockefeller, adopted a
set of draconian laws, including life imprisonment for possession of a pound of
cocaine or heroin, and a minimum of fifteen years for possession of two ounces
of any illegal drug. In one poll, Americans said by a margin of three to one that it
was more important to “take any step necessary” to stop drug use than to “protect
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toward retribution as an end goal of the criminal legal system in and of itself.90 It
always has created unique consequences for women of color. 91 Women with
prostitution convictions may lose custody of their children and suffer from the
collateral consequences of a criminal legal system focused on assigning blame on
those whom society perceives as blameworthy. 92 Retributivism is highly
problematic because expanding the offenses that could be treated as criminal only
leads to the breakdown of communities and families.93
C. Retribution Promotes a Power Grab and Racial Disparities
While mass incarceration and criminalization were fueled by public anxiety and
anger toward drug dealers, it was also motivated by the system actors’ own desires
to expand their jurisdiction and exercise control over the population.94 It contributed
to the legitimization of the criminal legal system as an institution for addressing
societal harms. 95 Punishment itself was deemed an appropriate State action for
civil liberties.” America’s leaders are happy to oblige. President Bush wants to
execute drug “kingpins,” and more than one state legislator has proposed
executing those who sell to children.
Id. (citations omitted).
90
For example, the 1988 Republican Platform reflects retributivist ideals in declaring
that Republicans “pushed a historic reform of toughened sentencing procedures for federal
courts to make the punishment fit the crime” and that Republicans “must never allow the
presidency and the Department of Justice to fall into the hands of those who coddle hardened
criminals.” Republican Party Platform of 1988, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 16, 1988),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1988 [https://perma.
cc/8G28-JYUP]. These statements are premised on the notion that punishment is a worthy
cause in and of itself and that characteristics of offenders justify punishment. See id.
91
See, e.g., Ritchie, supra note 7, at 369.
92
See Alyssa M. Barnard, “The Second Chance They Deserve”: Vacating Convictions
of Sex Trafficking Victims, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1472 (2014) (describing how
prostitution-related convictions can be detrimental during custody disputes).
93
Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent
Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2010) (“There seems to be a growing sense
that ‘the revolving door’ in and out of prison results in the breakdown of families, collapse
of local economies, and destruction of entire communities.”).
94
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1303–04 (2001) (suggesting that “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” policies “seem to be
fueled by concerns about retribution . . . .”).
95
Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American
Justice at the End of the Century (reviewing MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE,
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995)), 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507–08 (1997):
This harsher mood has been accompanied by a new public, legislative, and
judicial enthusiasm for punishment. Where once, in the not too distant past,
revenge, even state sanctioned and administered revenge, was considered a hardly
respectable rationale for administering a criminal justice system, since the mid-
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coercing desirable behavior. 96 It legitimized the expansive powers of certain actors
within the criminal legal system. William Stuntz has discussed how the expansive
powers of prosecutors contributed to the passage of unnecessary criminal laws.97 By
expanding the menu of crimes and punishments that prosecutors can select in each
case, legislators have anointed prosecutors as quasi-legislators.98 For any given case,
criminal law is not a limit on prosecutors’ power, requiring that they merely execute
the law.99 Rather, it is a tool that prosecutors can use to legislate and manipulate by
criminalizing actions that are not obviously criminal, relying on overly broad
legislation, and manipulating defendants into plea agreements that are not
proportional to their factual conduct. 100 Jeannine Bell has discussed the role
increased police discretion plays in contributing to mass incarceration. 101 Like
prosecutors, the broad legislation and menu of sanctions have emboldened police
officers to control and regulate communities of color.102 Offenses such as disorderly
conduct, which require subjective determinations by police officers, can be used to
displace elements of the community they deem undesirable. 103 The police and
prosecutors held (and continue to hold) nearly unrestrained power to deem
seventies retribution has come back with a vengeance, enjoying today a greater
prominence in public discourse over crime and punishment than at any other time
in post-war America.
Id. (citations omitted); Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 117 (2000) (noting that, according to
retributivists, “[p]unishment could only be justified—and limited—by the moral desert of
offenders. Retributivists participated in public debates over criminal justice policy, attacking
probation, parole, indeterminate sentencing, rehabilitative programs, and determinist
accounts of crime, whether invoked to excuse individuals or to justify ameliorative social
programs.” (citations omitted)).
96
See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation
of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 429
(2005) (“When the state credibly threatens to use coercion through retributive practices, that
threat suffices to express the norm that our actions and our interests matter to the state.”).
97
Stuntz, supra note 16, at 534.
98
Id. at 538. (“Likewise, broadening criminal liability makes it easier, across a range
of cases, to induce a guilty plea—precisely because the prosecution is so likely to win if the
case goes to trial. And more prosecutorial victories at lower cost advances not
only prosecutors’ welfare, but legislators’ as well.”).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 537.
101
See Jeannine Bell, Note, Policing Hatred: Police Bias Units and the Construction
of Hate Crime, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 449 (1997) (“While discretion creates flexibility,
in environments with few controls, inadequate resources, and indeterminate objectives, how
police officers manage conflicting goals is also political.”).
102
Id. at 448.
103
See Carbado, supra note 18, at 1486 (“[A] police officer is more likely to view three
black teenagers on a street corner as a sign of disorder than he is to so view three white
teenagers on a street corner. The attribution of disorder to African-Americans occurs at the
community level as well.” (citation omitted)).
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individuals worthy of forgiveness, or not.104 Law enforcement officers can exercise
their discretion to pursue a limited number of cases and often do so to the detriment
of communities of color.105 There is substantial research that shows that implicit
racial biases inform how we interact with the world and helps to explain the
persistent racial disparities in the criminal legal system.106 Retributivism facilitates
racial disparities by building implicit bias into the system:
Despite their objective to eliminate invidious racial bias, policies
such as just deserts and sentencing guidelines have increased racial
disparities in the American criminal legal system.
...
Racial disparities in the criminal legal system have worsened in the
past 15 years. African Americans make up larger proportions of people
admitted to jails and prisons, and of jail and prison inmates, than ever
before. Moreover, those proportions are steadily increasing.107
Black and brown people face racial profiling by police, discriminatory prosecutorial
charging practices, and harsher sentences by judges, who must all make the
subjective determination about whether they are worthy of punishment or
forgiveness. 108 By policing black communities more intensely, system actors
avoided much of the negative consequences of mass criminalization because much
of the harms of mass criminalization were experienced by outgroups.109 The criminal
legal system has demonized black people—black men as predators and drug
traffickers, and black women as prostitutes, welfare queens, and baby mamas who
abuse entitlement programs.110

104

Stuntz, supra note 16, at 534.
See Bell, supra note 101, at 449.
106
See Ariela Rutbeck-Goldman & L. Song Richardson, Race and Objective
Reasonableness in Use of Force Cases: An Introduction to Some Relevant Social Science, 8
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 145, 149 (2017) (“Social science research over the last few decades
suggests that we unconsciously associate Black men with danger, criminality, and
violence. This is because ‘violence and criminality have typified the stereotype of Black
Americans for well over half a century.’”) (quoting Jenessa Shairo, Following in the Wake
of Anger: When Not Discriminating Is Discriminating, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1356, 1357 (2009)).
107
Michael Tonry, Sentencing Reforms and Racial Disparities, 78 JUDICATURE 118,
118 (1994).
108
See generally Roberts, supra note 21 (describing the social costs of mass
incarceration).
109
See Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for the
Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 747
(2011) (describing the rise of the term “juvenile super-predators,” who were predestined for
careers as violent criminals, as an excuse for excessively punitive policies).
110
Id.
105

180

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

The tendency to view black women as more blameworthy since the turn to
retributivism is illustrated in the case of Cyntoia Denise Brown.111 Cyntoia Brown
was an underage prostitute who had been raped on multiple occasions. 112 She
experienced violence at the hands of her pimp and clients, and she had been forced
to meet with a new client. After experiencing previous rapes, she shot her new client
and was charged with premeditated murder.113 When the prosecutor was assessing
whether Cyntoia was a blameworthy murderer or an underage sex trafficking victim,
the prosecutor chose the former.114 The jury agreed, and she is currently serving a
life term in prison.115 There was no self-defense for Cyntoia Brown. While the terms
of her punishment are expressed in racially neutral terms, the reliance on blame and
popular perceptions of black women ensured that Cyntoia would be treated like
another wrongdoer who was worthy of blame. By contrast, George Zimmerman
successfully argued that he was acting in self-defense when he shot an unarmed
black teen, Trayvon Martin, in an encounter Zimmerman initiated. 116 The jury
determined that he was not worthy of blame because he reasonably acted in selfdefense.117
While an underage girl forced to work in prostitution is conceivably less
“blameworthy” than a middle-aged man seeking an altercation with a teenager,
dominant morality about who is blameworthy in the United States suggests
otherwise.118 These two cases illustrate how racial bias can infect judgments about
blameworthiness, forgiveness, and desert. Retributivism is a vehicle for legitimizing
racial bias by indicating that certain people deserve to be punished, while presenting
the veneer of neutrality.119
The criminal legal system also manages and sorts individuals, which is
consistent with the retributivist aim of assigning blameworthiness.120 Issa KohlerHausmann has provided evidence that complicates how we think about the purposes
111
See State v. Brown, No. M2007–00427–CCA–R3–CD, 2009 WL 1038275, at *30
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 28, 2009).
112
Id. at *4.
113
Id. at *1.
114
Id.
115
Id. at *10.
116
See Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your
Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1099, 1117 (2014).
117
Id.
118
Compare State v. Brown, No. M2007–00427–CCA–R3–CD, 2009 WL 1038275, at
*30 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 28, 2009) with
Franks, supra note 116.
119
See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995) (“Punishing black people for the fruits of
racism is wrong if that punishment is premised on the idea that it is the black criminal’s ‘just
desserts.’”).
120
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 611 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1367
(2012).
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of punishment.121 She suggests that the criminal legal system also plays a sorting
and managerial role and thus is a vehicle for social control as a larger project that is
broader than the criminal legal system itself. 122 Those individuals with multiple
contacts with the system, even for minor and misdemeanor charges, demonstrate an
added level of blameworthiness that can be used to justify harsh sentences if they
face additional charges at a future date. It is not retributivist in the traditional sense
in that it assigns guilt without regard for blameworthiness in the particular case.123
However, it is retributivist on a systemic level by providing data that may serve as
justification for future determinations about blameworthiness.
D. Retribution Leads to Systemic Dysfunction
Several scholars have expressed their concerns about the disfunction mass
criminalization creates. Sanford Kadish worried about the expanding role of the
federal criminal system and the harms of overcriminalization. 124 William Stuntz
discussed extensively the role of expansive prosecutorial discretion in increasing
rates of incarceration. 125 Critical race theorists have discussed the racially
discriminatory impact of drug crime enforcement, policing, and prosecutorial
practices. Angela Harris has argued that there is a need for transformative justice
processes to address the harms of mass incarceration. 126 Devon Carbado has
discussed how black people’s vulnerability to police surveillance and police
interactions contribute to their mass incarceration.127 Monica Bell recently argued
that racially biased policing practices contribute to a culture of legal cynicism within
communities of color that make them less likely to cooperate with law enforcement
officials, whom they view as illegitimate.128 This body of scholarship highlights that
criminal law scholars are concerned about how the criminal system has been
operating and expanding.
These scholars share a concern that the criminal legal system is not doing what
it is intended to do. In fact, it is expanding to the detriment of society and is
entrenched in discriminatory practices that only serve to exacerbate and encourage
121

Id.
Id.
123
See id. (“A system that punishes without bothering to check whether a particular
defendant actually ‘did it’ is one that does not care much about fault. This is, to say the least,
an odd model of criminal justice. It is not retributive, since retributivism keys punishment to
individual desert.”).
124
See generally Kadish, supra note 16 (arguing that there was evidence of
overcriminalization because of the breadth of the criminal law and extensive list of conduct
that was criminalized).
125
See Stuntz, Reply, supra note 19, at, 832–34.
126
See Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a
Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 57–59 (2011).
127
See Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 548 (2017).
128
See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,
126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2059 (2017).
122
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lawless behaviors.129 Mass incarceration and mass criminalization should be viewed
as indicators of disfunction within the system if the purpose of criminal law is to
improve societal outcomes.130 Despite the acknowledgment of the problems of the
criminal legal system, there have been few attempts to theorize about its purposes
and reimagine what the criminal legal system should be doing.131 If the purpose is
to control undesirable communities, then the criminal legal system reflects a wellfunctioning institution that is controlling black and poor communities and ensuring
that individuals within those communities are disqualified from full citizenship once
they return from terms of incarceration.132 However, for scholars who want to ensure
that the criminal legal system is not used as a tool for subordinating entire
communities, mass incarceration should be a viewed as a form of systemic
disfunction insofar as it prevents the system from reflecting democratic ideals that
protect the entire populace.133
The very act of assessing the blameworthiness and morality of vice conduct,
without considering the consequences of behaviors, makes these moral judgments
susceptible to the premises and biases that exist in a racist or patriarchal society. It
relies upon a shared understanding of appropriate social conduct that itself
prejudices outsiders.134 One of the primary critiques of retributivism is its inability
129
Cf. Tom R. Tyler, Can the Police Enhance Their Popular Legitimacy Through Their
Conduct?: Using Empirical Research to Inform Law, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1971, 1980 (2017)
(describing how distrust in the police institution can undermining police legitimacy,
impacting the public’s willingness to comply with the police and prevent escalated
interactions).
130
See infra Part III.
131
See Weisberg, supra note 13, at 1203–04.
132
Cf. Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 TEX. L. REV. 651, 681 (2017)
(reviewing MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (2015)) (describing the abolitionist movement as a response to the
conception of the criminal legal system as a tool for social control and marginalization).
133
See, e.g., Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass
Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 301, 302–03 (2017) (“In the last decade, scholars,
lawyers, government officials, and policymakers have come to recognize that
our criminal justice system is seriously dysfunctional.”). There are many symptoms of this
dysfunction:

[T]he disproportionate punishment of indigent people of color; the lack of
meaningful public defense funding; the continuing identification of wrongful
convictions; the detention of defendants who do not have money to satisfy bail
conditions; internationally unprecedented, severe sentences, including the
mandatory minimums that may result in questionable guilty pleas and often
require judges to impose excessively harsh sentences; the “plea mill” system in
misdemeanor courts; and the destructive social impact of collateral
consequences.
Id. (citations omitted).
134
See Reginald C. Oh, Mapping A Materialist Latcrit Discourse on Racism, 52 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 243, 246 (2005) (arguing that “dominant legal narratives that rationalize existing
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to provide substantial content to its primary aim of deserved punishment.135 Does
deserved punishment mean “an eye for an eye,” meaning the offender is punished in
ways similar to how they harmed? Does it mean retribution to the community
affected? Is there a meaningful way to outline the limits of deserved punishment,
particularly when dealing with crimes that have no obvious victim? What does it
mean to say a sex worker is morally worthy of punishment? If the sex worker’s
community is better served by allowing her to continue her work while providing
for her children, is it morally acceptable to punish her? Does the perception of blame
depend upon the sex worker’s race or socioeconomic status? The proportionality
question faces a similar challenge. How is proportionality measured and who
assesses what is deserved?
The harms of the retributive approach are evident by the failures of a
punishment-driven approach in mass incarceration.136 And the type of utilitarianism
that is reflected in criminal jurisprudence really is a very limited utilitarianism that
focuses on deterrence and incapacitation as its primary aims, with rehabilitation
falling to a distant third. These aims of punishment are worthy, but in considering
the aims of criminalization, utilitarianism should adopt a much broader definition.
Distributive consequentialism addresses these limitations by providing a framework
for a criminal legal theory that is community-centered and deliberately
nonmoralizing.137
II. CREATING A PRESUMPTION AGAINST CRIMINALIZATION: THE CRIMINAL
LEGAL SYSTEM AS A STRUCTURAL HARM
Given the negative externalities of mass incarceration and mass
criminalization, criminalization in the United States should be viewed suspiciously,
and the criminal legal system itself should be treated as relevant a harm for
communities that face intersectional forms of discrimination. 138 Intersectionality
goes beyond acknowledging that there are multiple systems of oppression; it
acknowledges that these systems may intersect with each other and result in

racial inequality tend to be structured as coherent narratives that distort and obscure the
concrete, material realities of racial subordination and inequality”); see also Claire
Chiamulera, Race Affects Perceptions About Sentencing and Culpability of Juvenile
Offenders, 31 CHILD. L. PRAC. 125, 125 (2012) (finding that race impacts perceptions of
blameworthiness and culpability for juvenile defendants, and the “role of race in perceptions
of juveniles’ sentencing and blameworthiness was the same for liberal and more conservative
participants.”).
135
See Christopher, supra note 60, at 849–50 (“[R]etributivism falls victim to its own
withering critique of other theories of punishment, retributivism succumbs to its own
‘Ishmael effect.’ That is, retributivism is incoherent.” (citations omitted)).
136
Binder & Smith, supra note 95, at 117.
137
See infra Part III.
138
See id.

184

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

overlapping and reinforcing barriers to opportunity.139 These overlapping systems
result in unique forms of oppression that only impact those in that particular,
marginalized group.140 An intersectional approach includes focusing on the unique
challenges that people who sit at the intersections of overlapping systems of
oppression, such as black immigrants (who face both racial discrimination and
discrimination because of their immigration status); or homeless transgender young
people (who face discrimination because of their gender identity, age, and their
housing status).141 For example, in the context of sex work, much of the rationale for
punishment has been expressed in terms of protecting the community, including sex
workers themselves, from the dangers of commercialized sex and sex trafficking.142
However, it may be more harmful to allow criminal intervention where the sex
worker might face immigration proceedings as a result of any criminal legal
intervention because she is also an immigrant. 143 A distributive consequentialist
approach would consider this as a relevant harm in assessing whether
criminalization is appropriate.
The very intervention of the criminal justice apparatus may be a harm that
affects women who sell sex, especially sex workers of color. Punishment will of
course create some harm to those who are punished, in the form of incarceration or
incapacitation. 144 A distributive consequentialist approach to criminalization is
unique in that it argues that this harm is a relevant consideration in assessing whether
the criminal legal system is the most appropriate intervention.145 The history of the
criminalization of sexual vices provides some insights into the connection between
moral judgments, retribution, and criminalization.

139
See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991).
140
Id.
141
See generally Ten Tips for Putting Intersectionality into Practice, OPPORTUNITY
AGENDA,
https://opportunityagenda.org/explore/resources-publications/ten-tips-puttingintersectionality-practice [https://perma.cc/7B8Q-F6EE] (outlining how intersectionality
can be incorporated into legal practice and advocacy and providing several examples of
groups facing intersectional discrimination).
142
See infra Part IV.
143
See John Christman, Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social
Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL. STUD. 143, 143 (2004) (refining the concept of relational
autonomy, which is defined as recognizing the individual as an “agent who is also socially
constituted and who possibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of interpersonal
relations and mutual dependencies. Relational views of the autonomous person, then,
valuably underscore the social embeddedness of selves while not forsaking the basic value
commitments of (for the most part, liberal) justice.” (citations omitted)).
144
Youngjae Lee, What Is Philosophy of Criminal Law? 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 671, 683
(2014) (reviewing THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (John Deigh
& David Dolinko eds., 2011)).
145
See infra Part III.
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A. The Criminalization of Sexual Vices
The criminalization of sex work has been increased since the early nineteenth
century. 146 However, in other areas of the law, there has been success in
decriminalizing conduct that was criminalized to enforce particular moral norms.
Interracial marriage,147 sodomy,148 the use of birth control,149 and abortion150 were
all criminalized primarily to enforce societal expectations on differing aspects of
sexuality. The criminalization of each of these activities seems almost primitive
now. 151 Today, it is taken as a given that individuals should be able to exercise
autonomy with what they do in their bedrooms during consensual activities.152 Yet,
146

Prostitution was only criminalized during the late 1800s and early 1900s during the
Progressive Era in the United States.
[T]he nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize prostitution was part of a
sometimes desperate attempt to enforce norms of marriage, chastity, and propriety
on women¾to keep women in the private sphere of home and family, to prevent
them from supporting themselves independently of men, to encourage them to
marry. This was partly an effort to protect women, who were seen as innocent,
vulnerable, and pure. But a contradictory set of beliefs and impulses was also at
work, portraying women¾particularly working-class women, women of color,
and immigrant women, but potentially all women¾as capable of destroying the
social order.
Ann M. Lucas, Race, Class, Gender, and Deviancy: The Criminalization of Prostitution, 10
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 50 (1995) (emphasis omitted); see also Noah Berlatsky, The
Law’s Tougher on Sex Workers Today Than It Was in the 19th Century, PACIFIC STANDARD
(OCT 5, 2015) https://psmag.com/social-justice/what-is-up-with-that [https://perma.cc/JR5
W-X4WM].
147
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
148
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
149
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
150
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
151
See Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359,
391–93 (2001) (describing the role public opinion has played in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on morality legislation).
152
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas and noted the
following:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.
Lawrence 539 U.S. at 578; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015)
(discussing the Court’s historical views of privacy in the bedroom).
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the criminalization of the commercialization of these activities seems so natural, that
even the most progressive feminists, who have no problem exposing their bodies for
commercial gain in television or movies, are suddenly prudish about the idea that
women might extend the commercialization of their bodies into the actual bedrooms
not just television and movie screens. 153 The criminalization of other forms of
“immoral” sexual behaviors provides insights on the continued criminalization of
sex work.
For most of American history, the consensual marriage of members of different
races was criminalized in the majority of states.154 Until the year 2000, states were
still removing state constitutional language that explicitly prohibited interracial
marriage.155 This criminalization was intended to advance a racialized moral agenda
focused on the preservation of the white race as a superior race and aimed to
maintain its purity by criminalizing the intermingling of races.156 Black people were
thought to be less civilized than whites, threatening white racial purity.157 The threat
of black male sexuality was of particular concern. 158 The Scottsboro Boys are a
famous example of the criminalization of black men because they were suspected of
153

Popular artists have come out against decriminalization of sex work, while ironically
portraying characters, which are decidedly sexually liberal and have the choice to frame their
own sexualities. There is a profound sense of irony in their moral outrage about the scourge
of prostitution. Many of them have been sexualized on screen, played objectified characters,
and work in an environment where sexual predation and rape is far from uncommon. Yet,
they are able to exercise the autonomy to engage in this work despite the risk while
condemning less privileged women from managing similar risks. See Letter from Coal.
Against Trafficking in Women to Amnesty Int’l Bd. of Dis. (July 17, 2015)
http://catwinternational.org/Content/Images/Article/621/attachment.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B4N2-24CR].
154
See, e.g., ALA. CODE 14:360 (1940) (stating that a person is prohibited from
marrying whites if they are a negro or a person with one drop of negro blood); Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (holding that states which bar interracial marriage do not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution); Cable Act, ch. 411,
42 Stat. 1021 (1922) (repealed 1936) (enacted by Congress to retroactively strip the
citizenship of any United States citizen who married an alien ineligible for citizenship);
Irving G. Tragen, Statutory Prohibitions against Interracial Marriage, 32 CAL. L. REV. 269
(1944) (discussing California’s history of anti-miscegenation statutes). But see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (a landmark civil rights case in which the Supreme Court struck
down all state laws banning interracial marriage in the United States). Most states in the
United States prohibited interracial marriages at some point, and this “historical prohibition
of interracial relationships exemplifies the state’s regulation of intimate life. Antimiscegenation laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage predate the Declaration of
Independence by more than a century. At one time or other 41 of the 50 states have enacted
such legislation . . . .” Debra Thompson, Racial Ideas and Gendered Intimacies: The
Regulation of Interracial Relationships in North America, 18 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 353, 354
(2009).
155
Thompson, supra note 154, at 368 n.4.
156
Id. at 361.
157
Id. at 362–63.
158
Id.
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morally corrupting and raping white women.159 In many respects, the policing of the
sexual relationships between white women and black men reflects the threat that
black masculinity posed to white masculinity.160
The racialized sexual agenda served a rational purpose and reflected a particular
brand of morality that aimed to protect society from social evils.161 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional for states to outlaw interracial
marriages and relationships. 162 The Court stated, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations” and rejected the lower court’s assertion that this law was necessary
to further “the State’s legitimate purposes . . . ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its
citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and
‘the obliteration of racial pride.’”163
Likewise, the criminalization of sodomy was a tool for suppressing
homosexuality which presumably served the expressive function of indicating
society’s disdain toward same-sex relationships. 164 In Lawrence v. Texas, 165 the
Supreme Court held that there is a substantive due process right that prohibits the

159

[T]he “trial” of the Scottsboro boys illustrated that gendered racism had tarnished
the racial landscape of the South. In the Scottsboro case, nine black boys faced
accusations of a “most foul and revolting crime” — the raping of “two defenseless
white girls.” The legal proceedings, however, constituted little more than a “legal
lynching.”
Marques P. Richeson, Sex, Drugs, and . . . Race-to-Castrate: A Black Box Warning of
Chemical Castration’s Potential Racial Side Effects, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 95, 111
(2009) (citations omitted); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Taking the “Garbage” Out in Tulia,
Texas: The Taboo on Black-White Romance and Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs,”
2007 WIS. L. REV. 283, 302–04 (2007) (describing the Tulia case in Texas, where 20% of
the black population was rounded up following a sting by a racist sheriff and many of the
targeted black people had been in interracial relationships white people, connecting to
criminalization to a racialized sexual morality).
160

In the immediate postwar years, and for some time thereafter, southern white men
as a body underwent a crisis in masculinity that is essential to comprehending the
seemingly irrepressible violence of Reconstruction. This crisis, marked by a
profound sense of unease around issues of status and identity, was rooted as much
in the peculiar conditions of southern history as it was in the deeply fraught nature
of the military conflict that they did so much to engender.
Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the Body Politic in the
Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 813 (2002).
161
Id.
162
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
163
Id. at 7, 12.
164
See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
165
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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criminalization of sodomy.166 The Court recognized the morality claims that Texas
argued supported this criminalization:
For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire
and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations
do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the
whole society through operation of the criminal law.167
The Court’s holding rendered state laws that criminalized sodomy
unconstitutional.168
Despite the changes in legal norms regarding sexually “immoral” conduct,
prostitution remains criminalized in all fifty states in the United States and is legal
only in a few counties in Nevada. 169 While the criminalization of prostitution
precedes the rise of retributivism, retributivism provides a basis for assigning blame
on a moral basis and legitimizes the continued criminalization of prostitution.
B. Retributivism and Vice Crimes
Retributivism provides a theoretical tool for assigning blame and using popular
morality as a sword against sexual deviants. Who “deserves” to be punished more
than those who corrupt our morality? As such, it is particularly problematic when
considering the criminalization of vice crimes. These crimes do not have victims in
the traditional sense. 170 For example, when a habitual marijuana user purchases
marijuana and consumes it in her private residence, the only person offended by the
conduct is the user herself, if you believe the consumption of marijuana is an
166

Id. at 578.
Id. at 571.
168
Id. Despite these cases, by 2005, twenty-six states criminalized adultery, and it
remains a felony in many of those states. See Tucker Culbertson, Arguments Against
Marriage Equality: Commemorating & Reconstructing Loving v. Virginia, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 575, 601 n.88 (2007).
169
See Daria Snadowsky, The Best Little Whorehouse Is Not in Texas: How Nevada’s
Prostitution Laws Serve Public Policy, and How Those Laws May Be Improved, 6 NEV. L.J.
217 (2005) (“[I]n 1959 the United Nations itself declared that prostitution should not be
considered a criminal offense. Yet it remains a troublesome and divisive legal issue in the
United States, where prostitution is punishable everywhere except for a few counties in
Nevada.” (citations omitted)).
170
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a
Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 TENN. L. REV. 291, 291 (2013)
(“One area where overcriminalization is most notable concerns victimless crimes, namely,
those where individual adults engage in conduct that inflicts only harm to self or to other
consenting adults, but not on third parties. These victimless crimes include prostitution,
pornography, sadomasochism, gambling, and most notably, drug crimes.”).
167
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inherent type of harm.171 But she has not taken another person’s property as in theft,
nor has she violated another person’s body as with assault. She has only committed
the act against herself. There is considerable literature about the victimless crime
and debate about whether these crimes are in fact so victimless.172
The problem with adopting a retributivist approach, particularly with conduct
that has historically been viewed as a vice, is that it privileges and re-entrenches
white supremacy and patriarchy. It does this because it presumes there is a standard
measure by which all conduct that does not directly harm another individual can
objectively be evaluated and considered. There is a “baseline” for morality that is
informed by culture and societal expectations.173 This moral code is often the same
code that has been used to support white male social dominance, rationalize slavery,
and often presupposes black criminality. 174 This morality assumes that there are
universal truths, which are in fact merely the reflection of a complex grammar used
to protect the interests of the powerful.175 It presupposes that there is an objective
baseline upon which moral conduct, particularly moral conduct that has no direct
physical, psychic, or financial harm to others, can be regulated according to abstract
understandings of morality.176 This baseline inevitably reflects the privileges and
171

But see Harcourt, supra note 50, at 172 (“The early progressive argument that the
use of marijuana was a ‘victimless crime’ was countered in the late 1970s and 1980s by a
campaign against drug use that emphasized the harms to society, and justified an all-out war
on drugs.”).
172
For example, some scholars argue that recreational drug use should be prohibited
because it could lead to consumption of other more harmful drugs because marijuana is a
gateway drug. See, e.g., Murat C. Mungan, Gateway Crimes, 68 ALA. L. REV. 671, 699–700
(2017) (“[A]s one scholar notes, ‘the original proposer of the gateway hypothesis, Denise
Kandel, concludes that the existing evidence for the gateway effect is at best mixed, because
of the lack of a clear neurological mechanism.’” (citations omitted)). Other scholars might
argue that criminalization of marijuana serves an expressive purpose and signals to society
that it is morally reprehensible to engage in the criminalized conduct. Thus, criminalizing
marijuana would signify to others, including young children, that such conduct is socially
undesirable. Criminalization of the vice conduct is also a signal of what society considers to
be immoral.
173
For example, when the Supreme Court initially held that laws that criminalized
sodomy were constitutional in Bowers, some Justices were concerned with preserving the
baseline morals of the community. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (reasoning that millennia of moral teachings against
homosexuality indicates that it is not a fundamental right).
174
See S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1997) (“[H]istory suggests that choosing one moral code over
another based only on majoritarian beliefs is not perhaps the wisest course of action. For
example, popular morality adamantly resisted women’s suffrage, miscegenation, and racial
integration . . . .”).
175
Id.
176
See Don Welch, The State as a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 540,
546 (1988) (“Implicit in the statement that laws are not necessarily moral is the view that
there is some kind of objective morality by which laws could theoretically be judged to be
moral or immoral.”).
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assumptions of those individuals making these moral assessments.177 It provides the
veneer of ethical objectivity when it is in fact a reflection of all the flaws of the
structures that allow for moral judgments.
The backdrop to any evaluation of whether conduct is moral or immoral is
precipitated by these discriminatory systems that are the very building blocks upon
which understandings of morals are interpreted.178 For example, it is difficult to state
objectively that sex work in the abstract is immoral unless you accept popularly
accepted values about sex and sexuality. Popular views about sex are intertwined
with assumptions about monogamy, marriage, and sexuality that are connected to
the Judeo-Christian tradition.179 It is a vice if you believe sex is something not to be
commercialized by the person who owns the body commercializing it. It presumes
that there is something universally unique about sex. Sex work becomes inherently

177

Culture is constructed relative to the society wherein one lives. See Alison Dundes
Renteln, Corporate Punishment and the Cultural Defense, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253,
256 (2010) (“Cultural relativism is a theory in anthropology that calls attention to the moral
code each society possesses. According to relativism, morality is socially constructed within
a given cultural community.”).
178
Id.
179
See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 200–01 (1996)
(discussing the Judeo-Christian emphasis on abstinence and sex for procreation). Valdes
states:
Judeo-Christian leaders, like their Greco-Roman counterparts, continued
this patriarchal construction and regulation of sex, gender, and sexuality as key
tools for cultural organization, but they introduced a new overriding objective:
abstinence. This objective, reflective of Christianity’s socio-sexual asceticism,
recognized only one potential exception: procreational sexual activity in the
context of marriage. Over time, this emphasis on sexual renunciation, and its
toleration only of marital procreational sexuality, reversed the Greek ideal of nonprocreational sexual intimacy: Under Christian sex/gender ideology, nonprocreational sensuality was no longer sublime, it was “sin.”
Id. (citations omitted).
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different from boxing,180 coal mining,181 domestic work, or other forms of dangerous
or at times demeaning labor, only if you accept that sexual labor is different.182
Declaring that “sex is different” is essentialist and informed by our culture, but it is
not self-evident as part of the nature of things. It is a socially constructed view about
the uniqueness of sex. There are other ways to view sex.183 Margaret Mead famously
argued that gender and sexuality are socially constructed, not biologically
determined. 184 She observed other expressions of female sexuality in other
cultures.185 While our cultural values may seem self-evident, they are conditioned
upon and maintain the power relations within a society.186 Retributivism presumes
universal truths and knowledge, when in fact such moral knowledge is often
constructed within the very systems that oppress marginalized communities.187 We
only understand the role of sex and other vices from the perspective of morality, in
the abstract, through our own subordination and marginalization within the system.
Thus, critical theorists should be skeptical of attempts to rely upon “morality”
as the basis for criminalizing “vice” in the abstract. Retributivism may also be used
as a tool to impose majoritarian values and morals upon minority groups.188 It can
be an instrument for separating the bad from the good, sending a message that
alternative morals or understandings of appropriate conduct should be punished.189
180
See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for
Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 711 (1998). Nussbaum states:

There is a stronger case for paternalistic regulation of boxing than of
prostitution, and externalities (the glorification of violence as example to the
young) make boxing at least as morally problematic, probably more so. And yet
I would not defend the criminalization of boxing, and I doubt that very many
Americans would either. Sensible regulation of both prostitution and boxing, by
contrast, seems reasonable and compatible with personal liberty.
Id.

181

See Adrienne D. David, Regulating Sex Work: Erotic Assimilationism, Erotic
Exceptionalism, and the Challenge of Intimate Labor, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1195, 1226 n.112
(2015) (“Coal mining and railroads topped the list for workplace accidents, followed by
logging, bricklaying, and masonry. These industrial accidents devastated not only workers,
but also their families.”).
182
See James S. Fishkin, Defending Equality: A View From the Cave, 82 MICH. L. REV.
755, 756 (1984) (reviewing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND QUALITY (1983)) (discussing how prostitution “perverts” shared
understandings about money and sex).
183
See generally MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE
SOCIETIES (1963) (discussing that the author discovered more evidence of temperamental
differences than differences between the sexes).
184
Id. at ix–xi.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Strong, supra note 174, at 1288.
188
Id.
189
Id.
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This is the case with sex workers who may be portrayed as human trafficking
victims, or still perceived as an object that must be cajoled out of the sex work
profession in order to achieve full womanhood and liberty.190 Retributivism is also
premised on the notion of goodness existing as a separate object from the individuals
who interpret it. While there may be some grounding for deontological arguments
pertaining to other types of conduct, deontological arguments are particularly
unpersuasive when you consider “vice” conduct.191 Criminalizing a victim for being
blameworthy because that victim has harmed themselves is troubling.
C. Creating a Presumption Against Criminalization
When the criminal law is being used to protect “vulnerable” groups, we should
be especially skeptical of it.192 As Bentham recognized, “all punishment is mischief:
all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be
admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater
evil.”193 In examining whether criminalization is justified, it is important to adopt an
approach that recognizes how different segments of the community experience and
interpret harm.194 In light of the harms of mass incarceration and penal expansion
we see in the United States, resorting to the criminal law to regulate the “harms” of
sex work only contributes to the current state of mass incarceration.195
As William Stuntz recognized, the criminal legal system has expanded and has
become “a one-way ratchet that makes an ever larger slice of the population felons,
and that turns real felons into felons several times over[.]”196 This expansion has
largely come to the detriment of communities of color. 197 The criminal justice
apparatus has inflicted violence upon marginalized communities worldwide, from
190
See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Dear John, You Are a Human Trafficker, 68 S.C. L.
REV. 415, 416 (2017) (misapplying empirical data to make universal claims about the victim
status of women engaged in prostitution).
191
See Ristroph, supra note 3, at 728 (“[A]t their worst, the claims of limiting
retributivism can display all the vices of punishment theory: unsupportable and unverifiable
claims to punitive power, divorced from a broader political theory and indifferent to the realworld implications of its claims.”).
192
See generally Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327 (2017)
[hereinafter Roberts, Dismissals as Justice] (arguing that criminal courts should use
dismissals for justice to address inequities in the criminal legal system).
193
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES AND MORALS OF
LEGISLATION 170 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1879) (1789).
194
See Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 10 (2010) (“[A] distributive theory of criminal law exposes that society’s distributionist
sentiments have not evaporated in the face of seemingly neutral arguments regarding rights,
economics, and limited government. Rather, society retains alternating instincts about
individual rights, efficiency, and distributive fairness.”).
195
See infra Sections II & IV.
196
Stuntz, supra note 16, at 509.
197
See generally Roberts, supra note 21 (describing the disproportionate impact the era
of mass imprisonment in America has had on racial minorities).
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coercive interrogations during apartheid198 and police soliciting bribes during traffic
stops in Johannesburg,199 to police shooting unarmed civilians in Baton Rouge200
and Ferguson 201 and incarceration for the inability to pay fines or fees. 202 The
criminal legal system has subordinated and controlled people of color from
Johannesburg to Los Angeles.203 Attempts to use it to vindicate people of color from
social “harm,” even the presumed harms of patriarchy, must be viewed
suspiciously.204
Moreover, there remains a legacy of white supremacy and patriarchy in the
United States.205 Sex workers of color who interact with the criminal legal system
must confront discrimination, which expresses itself in manners unique to sex
workers of color.206 “For example, officers often perceive sex workers of color and
those who identify as transgender as ‘highly sexualized and sexually available,’ and
thus target them for detention and arrest.”207 Officers also often request sexual favors
198

For example, during a public TRC hearing, Zanele Zingxindo testified that she
experienced sexual torture during a police interrogation. Ayumi Kusafuka, Truth
Commissions and Gender: A South African Case Study, 9 AFR. J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 45,
57 (2010).
199
ANDREW FAULL, INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, CITY BLUES: CORRUPTION AND
CORRUPTION MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA’S METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 2
(2008).
200
Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Baton Rouge Officers Will Not Be Charged in
Alton Sterling’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/
us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge.html [https://perma.cc/PKL2-6C8Y].
201
Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siegeafter-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/5MD6-AZA5] (last updated Aug. 10, 2015).
202
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 56 (2015).
203
See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1156, 1186–87 (2015) (“As recently as the 1990s, some Los Angeles police officers referred
to cases involving young African American men as ‘N.H.I.’ cases, standing for ‘no humans
involved.’” (citations omitted)).
204
See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1272 (describing the many social harms that have
stemmed from mass incarceration).
205
See Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing Justice
in the Wake of Global Neoliberalism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1513, 1547–48 (2011) (“[T]he
legacies of de jure white supremacy continue to litter the landscape of the United
States . . . .”). “[C]olorblindness and post-racialism can only mean, in practice, a selfdeluding commitment to not seeing racially stratified social realities. And, of course, this
blindness to racialized realities leaves the neocolonial legacies of racialized injustice in place.”
Id.
206
See Krishna de la Cruz, Comment, Exploring the Conflicts Within Carceral
Feminism: A Call to Revocalize the Women Who Continue to Suffer, 19 SCHOLAR: ST.
MARY’S L. REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 79, 90 (2017).
207
Id.; see also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration:
Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418,
1426–27 (2012) (“Intersectionality also points to the relationships between established
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from them to avoid arrest. 208 The issue of whether prostitution should be
criminalized should consider this fact. 209 A criminal legal theory that is
intersectional in approach should address how racial, gender, and LGBTQ and other
forms of discrimination exacerbate biases within the criminal legal system.
Kimberlé Crenshaw has discussed the need for a more intersectional approach in
criminal law:
[S]ome of the dominant frames pertaining to mass incarceration reveal
little about how women are situated as objects of social control and are not
analytically attentive to the dynamics that contribute to this particular
population’s vulnerability to incarceration. For example, although race
has become a central feature in the growing understanding of mass
incarceration as a contemporary manifestation of racial ordering, women
are rarely if ever a focal point of this frame.210
Sex workers of color are often profiled and labeled as less worthy.211 A criminal
legal theory motivated by assessing “blameworthiness” will inevitably prejudice
them and continue the disparities they experience within the criminal legal system.212
Consequently, an intersectional approach to questions of criminalization and
punishment requires placing suspicion of the criminal legal system to the
forefront.213 This approach begins by asking how we can reduce interactions with
the criminal legal system to lessen the harms it inflicts upon these communities.214
It is a different departure point in that it is not premised on the notion that the

hierarchies that structure the relative vulnerability of subjects to the public and private
exercises of social power.”).
208
de la Cruz, supra note 206, at 90.
209
See Deborah M. Weissman, Rethinking a New Domestic Violence Pedagogy, 5 U.
MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 635, 646 (2015) (“Women, especially transgender women
and sex workers are frequent targets of stop and frisk practices, and often suffer sexual and
physical assault by police deploying these tactics.”).
210
Crenshaw, supra note 207, at 1422.
211
See de la Cruz, supra note 206, at 90.
212
See Jonathan D. Glater, Race Gap: Crime vs. Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/weekinreview/07glater.html [https://perma.cc/
MKH7-VL3Y].
213
See infra Part IV.
214
Crenshaw, supra note 139, at 1246.
Where systems of race, gender, and class domination converge, as they do in the
experiences of battered women of color, intervention strategies based solely on
the experiences of women who do not share the same class or race backgrounds
will be of limited help to women who because of race and class face different
obstacles.
Id.
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criminal legal system is legitimate.215 Rather, the criminal legal system is viewed as
likely illegitimate with a negative influence that must be minimized and mitigated.216
Accordingly, punishment and criminalization are tools that should be used rarely,
and cautiously.217 The placement of women who have been convicted of prostitution
on sex registries is only one example of the harms of the criminal justice
apparatus. 218 Accordingly, the primary focus in an intersectional approach to
criminal legal theory is preventing, not justifying, interaction with the criminal legal
system.219
III. DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM
We need a new approach to criminal law theory ready to address the negative
externalities of mass criminalization and mass incarceration.220 As discussed in the
previous section, mass incarceration is an indicator of systemic malfunction.
Lawyers—including prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys—are the primary
guardians and architects of the criminal legal system, and thus criminal legal theory
should be concerned with addressing this malfunction. 221 Distributive
consequentialism is a theory about criminalization that is rooted in the notion that
the actual consequences of conduct should be carefully evaluated in determining
whether that conduct should be criminalized.222 It is a “grounded”223 criminal legal
215

But see Walter Benjamin, The Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 277, 284 (1978)
(discussing how violence is a critical component of how law-making occurs and the very
goal of the law is to exercise domination and exact violence to preserve itself).
216
Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 207, at 1471 (discussing the under-protection and overpolicing of women of color who experience intersectional forms of discrimination).
217
See discussion supra Part II.
218
See, e.g., Susan Dewey & Tonia P. St. Germain, Sex Workers/Sex Offenders:
Exclusionary Criminal Justice Practices in New Orleans, 10 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 211,
211 (2015) (discussing how individuals convicted of prostitution were forced to register as
sex offenders in Louisiana up until 2012).
219
Pending decriminalization of appropriate crimes, there are other remedies available
for minimizing the impact of the criminal legal system. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679–80
(1995) (arguing that jury nullification is a tool for reducing the harms of the criminal system);
Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, supra note 192, at 329–32 (arguing that criminal courts
should use dismissals to prevent injustices in the criminal legal system).
220
See Weisberg, supra note 13, at 1203–04.
221
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 20, at 98.
222
This approach has been described as a distributional approach to utilitarianism,
which is concerned with how “happiness” is distributed. See Gruber, supra note 194, at 10.
223

A grounded theory is one that is inductively derived from the study of the
phenomenon it represents. That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally
verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that
phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal
relationship with each other. One does not begin with a theory, then prove it.
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theory for considering whether criminalization is appropriate. It is a
consequentialist, or utilitarian, approach because it concerned with the actual
outcomes of the conduct.224 Unlike retributivist approaches, it is not concerned with
blameworthiness or morality in the abstract. Rather, it is a decidedly empirical
approach to criminalization because there is such a focus on what works.225
The distributive consequentialist framework allows for a careful consideration
of all the harms associated with the conduct, and a determination of what will be
best for society. The purpose is enhancing overall happiness. It disavows itself from
judgments about what is moral and immoral and is instead concerned with outcomes.
In this way, it is an empirical analysis that considers facts, data, outcomes, and can
sometimes be quantified. This is not to say that data cannot be easily manipulated,
nor that data does not also embed and reflect structural biases. Rather, some data on
the outcomes of the conduct will allow us to be driven by the results of
criminalization not the moral judgments of a few privileged souls about who is
worthy of punishment.
A. Examining the Harms of Criminalization
Distributive consequentialism is concerned with the negative externalities of
criminalization itself.226 Scholars and lawmakers should consider the actual harms
of the criminal legal system when evaluating whether criminalization is appropriate.
Joel Feinberg argued that criminalization is always harmful to the offender and thus
the harms of criminalization need not be factored in when considering the
appropriateness of punishment.227 However, the harms of the criminal legal system
might work to undermine the very goals of the system. For example, if
criminalization will make a community less safe and drive the community into
poverty when the goal of the criminal legal system is to deter crime, then it would
be foolish not to consider the harms that the system might inflict upon that
community.
The harms of criminalization do not just fall on the person who is accused of
committing a crime. The harms of criminalization fall on the entire community

Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is
allowed to emerge.
ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED
THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 23 (1990).
224
Id.
225
Id. at 23–25. It is worth noting that blind commitment to empiricism and data is also
problematic. Knowledge is always constructed within a particular context, and the limitations
of a particular research study or methodology should always be made clear.
226
See supra notes 222–225 and accompanying text.
227
See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 38, at 75–76.
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where that individual resides. 228 Law enforcement agencies are increasingly
adopting predictive models to aid in crime fighting. 229 Predictive models use
algorithms to predict future crime patterns and may designate particular areas as “hot
spots” that are susceptible to crime and even calculate an individual’s likelihood to
commit crime.230 This trend toward predictive law enforcement is problematic when
coupled with an expansive list of conduct that can reasonably be considered
criminal.231 If more conduct is criminalized, then the models may be more expansive
in targeting particular communities, even where the offenses are not very serious.232
This becomes problematic because the community where the suspected offenses are
occurring will be targeted along with the individuals officers anticipate will engage
in the future crime.233 Thus, the harms of criminalization are not narrowly confined
to the individual who may face punishment. The entire community wherein the
individual resides experiences the harm. After reviewing data that reveals that a
minor crime is likely to occur in one community, the local police may decide to
increase patrols and visibility in that community.234 In some areas, the increased
police presence may be welcomed. 235 In others, it may be proof to most of the
residents that they are viewed as potential suspects by the police, who constantly
surveil them.236
Furthermore, many police departments have adopted the broken windows
policing strategy, which presumes that police can deter violent crime by targeting
individuals for less serious public order offenses.237 George L. Kelling and James Q.
Wilson popularized the controversial strategy known as “broken windows policing”
in a 1982 piece in the Atlantic Monthly, where they theorized that the policing of
“public disorders,” such as loitering and nuisance offenses, reduces the incidence of
228

See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76
MD. L. REV. 952, 971 (2017) (discussing how the use of historical data can lead to over
policing of marginalized communities).
229
See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment,
89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 42–43 (2014).
230
See id. at 44–46.
231
See id. at 42–43.
232
See id.
233
See id.
234
See id. at 42–43 (describing how “predictive policing permits the police to harness
thousands of data points to forecast where crime is likely to happen. The most basic models
rely on past crimes, but data sources can include factors as variable as payday schedules,
seasonal variation, liquor store locations, and potential escape routes.”).
235
But see Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry,
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 501 (2000)
(acknowledging that even though “some citizens were law-abiding and welcomed police
presence, the broad reach of stop and frisk policing risked placing many law-abiders under
suspicion.”).
236
See Bell, supra note 128, at 2058–59.
237
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/Y25V-T62H].
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serious and violent crimes. 238 Broken windows policing approaches range from
highly aggressive order maintenance strategies, including misdemeanor arrests and
stop-question-frisks,239 to problem-oriented and community-coordination strategies.
This style of policing has been widely adopted although the data on its efficacy is
mixed. The entire community experiences the results of this form of profiling, which
brings additional police intrusion into their daily lives. 240 Criminalization of
additional offenses impacts this community directly because the more conduct
police target, the more excuses they have to interfere with the daily lives of these
community members.241 While the originators of this strategy claim to have proven
its effectiveness, the social science research on its effectiveness is mixed at best.242
In fact, the National Research Council was unable to conclude that it is an effective
strategy for reducing crime.243
B. Factors in Analysis
When conducting a distributive consequentialism analysis, there should be an
explicit recognition of the harms that criminalization aims to address: (1) What is
the harm244 that occurs from the conduct in question; (2) who is most affected by the
harm; and (3) what harm would result from leaving the conduct decriminalized?
These are empirical questions that should have clear answers prior to calling for
criminalization. To be fair, these questions are often implicitly addressed in public
debates and in legislative sessions, but they are not always made explicit. Clearly
stating the alleged harm and engaging in a careful evaluation of criminalization
should happen before conduct is criminalized. A legitimate harm should amount to
more than regulating the morality of society.245 It should be a clear injury that can
be traced to the conduct in question.
The second set of questions should turn to the harms associated with
criminalization of the particular conduct in question: (1) What results are likely to
238

Id.
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, AN
ANALYSIS OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE SUMMONSES, QUALITY-OF-LIFE MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS,
AND FELONY CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY, 2010–2015, at 2 (2016).
240
See Fagan & Davies, supra note 235, at 501.
241
See Carolyn Calhoun, Note, Bullseye on Their Back: Police Profiling and Abuse of
Trans and Gender Non-Conforming Individuals and Solutions Beyond the Department of
Justice Guidelines, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 127, 135 (2017) (“[S]tatistics show that local
law enforcement nonetheless profiles trans women and others perceived to not conform to
gender stereotypes because of the stereotypical belief that they participate in sex work.”).
242
Anthony A. Braga et al., Can Policing Disorder Reduce Crime? A Systematic
Review and Meta-analysis, 52 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 567, 568 (2015).
243
Id.
244
Harm must require “conventional causation with provable harm tied directly to the
practice as a whole.” Jonathan Turley, The Loadstone Rock: The Role of Harm in the
Criminalization of Plural Unions, 64 EMORY L.J. 1905, 1938 n.138 (2015).
245
Id.
239
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occur if the conduct is criminalized; (2) will criminalization address the harm we
seek to address; (3) what are the likely collateral consequences of criminalizing this
conduct; (4) who will experience these consequences; (5) are the harms of
criminalization primarily experienced by the offender; (6) are other community
members likely bear the consequences of criminalization; (7) is it appropriate for the
state to criminalize this conduct; and (8) are there are noncriminal options for
addressing the behavior available?
This analysis allows for consideration of the various outcomes that may result
from criminalization. It does not presume that criminalization is the best path for
addressing undesirable, or even harmful, conduct. It is consequentialist, in that it is
concerned with the outcome of the conduct and deliberately utilitarian in its focus
on community effects and outcomes.246 It is also empirical by expecting that we
apply what we already know about criminalization into the analysis about whether
conduct should be criminalized. It provides the foundation for a criminal legal theory
rooted in the experience of communities and deliberately concerned with how
marginalized communities experience criminalization. The experience of these
communities should be a factor in considering whether the harms of criminalization
outweigh the harms of the conduct itself. 247 For example, community surveys,
ethnographic research, and public opinion polling can all serve as relevant evidence
in assessing whether the conduct should be or remain criminalized.
The third step in a distributive consequentialist model is evaluating how the
harms of the conduct and how the harms of criminalization are distributed
throughout society, focusing particularly on the community most directly impacted
by the conduct and criminalization. This approach would eliminate absurd outcomes
that may result from a purely consequentialist approach that is solely concerned with
wealth maximization with little concern for how that wealth is distributed. 248 A
distributive analysis ensures that the harms of either the conduct or the
criminalization are not disproportionately borne by a small segment of the
community.249
246

See Eldar Haber, The Meaning of Life in Criminal Law, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 763,
784–85 (2016) (Explaining that under consequentialist theory, “criminal liability and
punishment are justified when they are the most effective method to deter future crime”).
247
Kuban v. McGimsey, 605 P.2d 623, 626 (Nev. 1980) (“It is proper that the
community most affected, either beneficially or adversely, have control over the area sought
to be regulated.”).
248
See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 206 (2003) (“Part of the problem is the use of
dubious arguments by punishment theorists and critics, employing surreal hypotheticals that
have little resonance in perceived reality or hurling criticisms at particular theories that could
easily apply to every approach to criminal sanctioning.”).
249
See Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical
Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3213 (2015) (“Distributional analysis
is . . . meticulous and deliberate contemplation of the many interests affected by the existing
criminal law regime and evidence-informed predictions about how law reform might
redistribute harms and benefits, not just imminently but over time.”).
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Finally, after considering the harms of the conduct, and then considering the
harms of criminalization, we must weigh how these harms are distributed throughout
society and conclude whether criminalization is appropriate. Policymakers should
consider whether there are noncriminal alternatives available for addressing the
conduct in question. 250 If there are noncriminal alternatives, lawmakers should
consider the evidence in support of or against the alternatives before resorting to
criminal sanctions. The chart that follows summarizes the approach.

Figure 4. Summary of Distributive Consequentialist Analysis
This analysis would also encourage outcomes that are more rational from a
systemic perspective.251 It would force system actors to be deliberate rather than
reactionary when calling for criminalization. 252 It also provides a platform for
250

But see Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications
of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 321 (2009)
(highlighting the limitations of alternatives to incarceration in substantially reducing
incarceration).
251
Jonathan Simon, The New Gaol: Seeing Incarceration like a City, 664 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 280, 281 (2016) (“During the massive build-up of the prison
population since the 1970s, all aspects of criminal justice were transformed into instruments
designed to move people as rapidly as possible and for as long as possible into
prisons . . . . [T]hat policy [is] now increasingly condemned as irrational, racially marked,
and inhumane . . . .” (citations omitted)).
252
Cf. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1071, 1136 (2017) (“Reactionary criminal laws based on a certain high-profile event
should also involve a criminal code review to ensure that existing legislation cannot
adequately punish individuals for the particular harm caused.”).
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beginning a project toward decarceration and provides theoretical support for
decriminalizing conduct that is best addressed outside the criminal legal system.
This approach does not presuppose the legitimacy of the criminal system as an
avenue to address all undesirable conduct. Rather, it acknowledges that the criminal
legal system has been used to expand the powers of its actors and those who benefit
from increasing social control of marginalized communities. 253 In the
criminalization of sex work, sex workers themselves should be the primary
community considered. This is especially the case where the policy rationale for
criminalization is to protect sex workers from the harms of the sex trade.254 Thus,
the distributive consequentialist inquiry is whether the structural harms of sex work
outweigh the harms of criminalization for sex workers.
IV. ANALYZING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SEX WORK
In determining whether sex work should be criminalized under a distributive
consequentialist analysis, one must first consider which community is harmed by
the conduct in question. 255 The primary focus should be on those who are most
impacted by the conduct and criminalization itself. Specifically identifying “the
harmed” allows the analysis to move from theoretical to more empirical
considerations in assessing whether conduct should be criminalized. It also allows
for normative judgments about the criminalized conduct that are sensitive to the
experiences of the affected community.
In the case of prostitution, the relevant community is composed of sex workers,
their clients, and those in the communities in which they work. 256 The romantic
253

Stuntz, supra note 16, at 506–10.
For an overview of the various debates concerning the decriminalization of sex
work, compare Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 328–29 (1995), and Carole S. Vance, More Danger, More
Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, in PLEASE AND DANGER:
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY xvi, xvii (Carole S. Vance ed., 1992) (critiquing radical
feminist approaches to sex work that view women as victims), with KATHLEEN BARRY,
FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 9 (1979), and ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHERINE MACKINNON,
PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 24–30 (1988)
(treating sex work as inherently problematic and violent for women).
255
See supra Part III.
256
The relevant may also include the children of sex workers. Kempadoo criticizes
radical feminists for failing to recognize that “the global sex trade cannot be simply reduced
to one monolithic explanation of violence to women”:
254

The agency of Brown and Black women in prostitution has been avoided or
overlooked and the perspectives arising from these experiences marginalized in
dominant theoretical discourse on the global sex trade and prostitution. Our
insights, knowledges, and understanding of sex work have been largely obscured
or dominated by white radical feminist, neo-Marxist or Western socialist feminist
inspired analyses that have been either incapable or unwilling to address the
complexities of the lives of women of color.
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partners of those directly involved in sex work transactions may be considered as
affected constituencies, but they have a lesser claim than those directly impacted by
the transaction itself.257 Some have argued that society at large is impacted by the
occurrence of sex work transactions through the influence of social norms and
morals.258 This interest may be one factor; however, it should not be the sole or even
a primary factor in the analysis. Popular morality often produces social hierarchies
that subordinate women, people of color, the poor, and others.259 If we are to make
legal decisions that impact these constituencies greatly, then we should consider the
unique vulnerabilities they experience because of the criminal legal system. Popular
morality should be a consideration only after determining that the harms of
criminalization do not greatly burden directly impacted communities.
Unlike pro-choice, LGBTQ rights, and civil rights advocates, pro-sex work
advocates have never been able to obtain similar successes.260 There is no Supreme
Court decision holding that the right to privacy extends to the right to commercialize
one’s private encounters.261 Pro-sex work advocates frequently, but unsuccessfully,
adopt liberal arguments about prostitutes’ right to choose work. 262 One of the
primary reasons for this failure was the lack of consensus amongst feminists on the
issue of prostitution. 263 Radical feminists argued that prostitution was a form of
Kempadoo, supra note 27, at 28, 40.
257
See Chaz Arnett, Virtual Shackles: Electronic Surveillance and the Adultification of
Juvenile Courts, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 399, 448 (2018) (describing the
importance of “community-informed” models of justice).
258
DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 254, at 24–25.
259
See Strong, supra note 174, at 1288 (arguing that “history suggests that choosing
one moral code over another based only on majoritarian beliefs” has harmful consequences
on individuals not in the majority).
260
See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming Roe v. Wade and holding that states are prohibited from banning most abortions);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have the right to have access to safe
and legal abortions); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that Colorado’s
Amendment Two, which denied LGBTQ people protections against discrimination, violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (holding that “the State cannot demean [gays’] existence or control their destiny
by making their private sexual conduct a crime”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (holding that bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional).
261
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (noting that the case “does not
involve . . . prostitution”); see also Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Research v. Gascon,
880 F.3d 450, 456–57 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Lawrence does not support a
constitutional right to sell sex for work).
262
Much of “traditional liberal theory . . . is committed to autonomy, individualism,
and minimal state interference in private choice. Liberal theory is premised on an assumption
that individuals are atomistic, pre-social beings who exist independent of their community.”
Jody Freeman, The Feminist Debate over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes’ Rights Groups,
Radical Feminists, and the (Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 86
(1990).
263
The feminist legal scholarship on the criminalization of sex work has been divisive,
leading some scholars to take a break from feminists and others to rely upon rhetoric and
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oppression and violence against women.264 Eventually, prostitution was conflated
with human trafficking, and feminists who opposed prostitution were able to
successfully obtain reforms based on a narrative of sex workers as victims and
victims of trafficking rings. 265 While relying mostly on anecdote and selective
representations, they told the story of the singular prostitute who entered the
profession as a child and who experienced horrific abuses at the hands of her clients,
pimps, and police. 266 This narrative has become predominant, particularly in the
United States.267
Accordingly, sex workers are often perceived as the primary “victims” in the
crime of prostitution.268 This approach is reflected in popular culture, the media, and
in feminist legal scholarship.269 So, if sex workers are indeed victims within these
transactions, then the harm analysis should focus on what harms criminalization
seeks to address, what harms sex workers experience through the criminalization of
sex work, and whether criminalization is the most appropriate avenue for addressing
the relevant harms. 270 Sex work itself has been discussed as a form of human
trafficking because many sex workers are presumed to have entered the profession
by force, coercion, or at a young age.271 Criminalization partially aims to address the
harms that sex workers experience by entering this risky and dangerous
inflammation over legal reasoning or empirical analysis. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT
DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 8–9 (2006) (highlighting the
importance of taking a “break” from feminist theory to develop alternative insights into
power relations and social theory).
264
Ronald Weitzer has criticized the methodology of the radical feminist approach:
Violating the canons of scientific inquiry, the radical feminist literature on
prostitution and other types of sex work is filled with “sloppy definitions,
unsupported assertions, and outlandish claims”; such writers select the “worst
available examples” of sex work and treat them as representative. Anecdotes are
generalized and presented as conclusive evidence, sampling is selective, and
counterevidence is routinely ignored. Such research cannot help but produce
questionable findings and spurious conclusions.
Ronald Weitzer, New Directions in Research on Prostitution, 43 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE
211, 214 (2005) (citations omitted).
265
Id. at 213.
266
Id. at 214.
267
See Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution
Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2010) (“[N]eoabolitionists have shaped common understandings of the problem of human trafficking by
deploying a reductive narrative of trafficking that simplistically depicts trafficking as
involving women and girls forced into ‘sexual slavery’ by social deviants.”).
268
Shelley Cavalieri, Between Victim and Agent: A Third-Way Feminist Account of
Trafficking for Sex Work, 86 IND. L.J. 1409, 1411 (2011).
269
See Chuang, supra note 267, at 1658.
270
See generally id. (discussing the driving questions behind the diverse ideologies of
anti-trafficking laws).
271
See id. at 1694–95.
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profession.272 In order to examine the validity of criminalizing sex work to address
these harms, we must review demographic data on those who enter the profession.
A. Demographics of Sex Workers
Reliable data on the contours of the profession are notoriously difficult to
find.273 There are multiple barriers that make obtaining this information challenging.
First, because sex work is criminalized and sex workers often face multiple forms
of discrimination, they are an exceptionally difficult population to study.274 They
may be hesitant to trust researchers, obtaining a sufficiently large and
“representative” population of sex workers is difficult due to the transient nature of
the work and the population, and the secrecy involved in this type of work. 275
Nevertheless, several studies capture some basic demographic information about sex
workers.276 While there are methodological issues in describing a generalizable age
of entry into prostitution, one study found that indoor sex workers,—who are sex
workers who do not solicit clients from street-based locations—typically enter the
profession at age 23.277 The mean age for sex workers was 33.278 Anywhere from 70
to 90 percent of sex workers work indoors.279 Yet, much of the mythology and policy

272

See id. at 1668–69.
Aziza Ahmed, Trafficked? AIDS, Criminal Law and the Politics of Measurement,
70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 96, 139–40 (2015) (describing the difficulty in measuring sex work and
trafficking).
274
Frances M. Shaver, Sex Work Research: Methodological and Ethical Challenges,
20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 296, 297 (2005).
275
Id. at 296.
276
See, e.g., Lauren Martin et al., Meaningful Differences: Comparison of Adult Women
Who First Traded Sex as a Juvenile Versus as an Adult, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1252,
1254 (2010).
277
Teela Sanders, A Continuum of Risk? The Management of Health, Physical and
Emotional Risks by Female Sex Workers, 26 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 557, 561 (2004). There
are serious methodological issues with broad pronouncements about the average age of entry
for people who enter prostitution:
273

The average age of first sex trade described in any study is dependent on the age
range of people included in each particular sample. For example, a study of sex
trading among adolescents will by virtue of the sample produce an average age of
first sex trade in the teens. This may or may not be generalizable to older
populations of people who trade sex.
Martin et al., supra note 276, at 1254.
278
Sanders, supra note 277, at 561.
279
Weitzer, supra note 264, at 214.
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around sex work is driven by perceptions about what street-based sex workers
encounter.280 Many sex workers are the primary income earners for their families.281
One study found that only 10 percent of sex workers in New York City have an
intermediary or pimp.282 While they do not comprise the majority of sex workers,
street-based workers do face some of the greatest scrutiny for engaging in their work
in public settings.283 Street-based sex workers experience violence at a much higher
rate than indoor sex workers:
A British study, for instance,[sic] of 115 prostitutes who worked on the
streets and 125 who worked in saunas or as call girls found that the street
prostitutes were more likely than the indoor workers to report that they
had ever been robbed (37 vs. 10%), beaten (27 vs. 1%),

280

See id. (“Much academic writing seems to equate prostitution with street prostitution.
In the United States, Britain, The Netherlands, and many other countries, however, only a
minority of prostitutes work on the streets (10–30%). Yet they receive the lion’s share of
attention, and findings on street prostitution are ‘often presented as a feature of sex work per
se.’” (citations omitted)).
281
See Kamala Kempadoo, Globalizing Sex Workers’ Rights, 22 CANADIAN WOMAN
STUD. 143, 145 (2003).
[W]ith disruptions to traditional household and family structures, women are
increasingly becoming heads of households, providing and nurturing the family.
With dwindling family resources and the Western emphasis on the independent
nuclear family, women must also increasingly rely on the state for provisions such
as maternity leave and childcare, yet fewer funds are allocated by governments
for social welfare programs. Informal sector work and “moonlighting” is growing
and engagement in the booming sex industries fills a gap created by globalization.
Id. (citations omitted).
282

Overall, our findings suggest that stereotypical pimps are far less common
and important to street sex markets than would be expected, given the popular
discourse and the priorities of contemporary antitrafficking institutions. In the
New York CSEC Study, only 10 percent of our sample of minors (n = 249) had a
pimp at the time of research (14 percent for women, 6 percent for men) and 1.6
percent lived with a pimp. In addition, 47 percent (34.7 percent of women, 61
percent of men, 66.7 percent of transgender) said that they did not know a single
pimp, suggesting low pimp prevalence. Pimps were responsible for initiating into
sex work 16 percent of the females, 1 percent of the males, and none of those who
were transgendered. At 8.1 percent overall, pimp initiation was far less common
than peer initiation . . . .
Anthony Marcus et al., Conflict and Agency Among Sex Workers and Pimps: A Closer Look
at Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, 653 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC.
SCI. 225, 231 (2014) (citations omitted).
283
See Weitzer, supra note 264, at 216.
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slapped/punched/kicked (47 vs. 14%), raped (22 vs. 2%), threatened with
a weapon (24 vs. 6%), or kidnapped (20 vs. 2%).284
Because of continued criminalization, police frequently profile and arrest sex
workers.285 Sex worker health has been compromised because police officers have
been allowed to use condoms as proof of prostitution.286
Most sex workers do not enter the profession through sex trafficking rings or
through force or coercion, but rather through peer recruitment.287 Most knowingly
enter the profession.288 The prevalence of sex work amongst women is suggestive of
the limited economic opportunities women generally face. For example, even when
women experience professional success, they often experience “gender
sidelining,”289 or outright sexual harassment that limits work opportunities or makes
the conditions of work hostile or undesirable.290 Consequently, women always face
constrained opportunities and must negotiate different risks in choosing work.
B. Harms of Criminalization
The next step of the inquiry is to examine the nature of the harm that stems
from criminalization itself. Criminalization has been shown to contribute to sex
workers’ experience of violence.291 By forcing them underground and creating an
284

Id.
Stacie Reimer Smith & Antonio Villaamil, Prostitution and Sex Work, 13 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 333, 334 (2012).
286
See Sandra Ka Hon Chu & Rebecca Glass, Sex Work Law Reform in Canada:
Considering Problems with the Nordic Model, 51 ALTA. L. REV. 101, 107 (2013).
287
See, e.g., Brendan M. Connor, In Loco Aequitatis: The Dangers of Safe Harbor
Laws for Youth in the Sex Trade, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 43, 51 (2016) (“[T]he best available
demographic evidence from the United States, as well as other high or middle-income
countries, shows that adolescents are typically introduced to trading sex by supportive peers
of other runaway, homeless, unstably housed, or systems-involved youth rather than by third
party coercion.”).
288
See Weitzer, supra note 264, at 213–14.
289
See Jessica Fink, Gender Sidelining and the Problem of Unactionable
Discrimination, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 57 (2018) (describing “the various ways in
which women across a wide range of employment settings may find themselves sidelined,
upstaged or otherwise marginalized in ways not reached by traditional anti-discrimination
laws”).
290
See Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the
Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 944
(1986) (describing the numerous structural barriers to economic equity that women
experience in the workplace).
291
In Sweden, the criminalization of client activities has resulted in a host of negative
outcomes for sex workers:
285

Since the passage of the law prohibiting the purchase of sexual services in
Sweden, sex workers who work on the street have reported increased risks and
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air of secrecy in their conduct, they are less able to seek the remedies that are
traditionally available to others.292 They are not free to solicit clients openly, in a bar
or online, without fearing the potential of arrest. 293 Criminalization forces sex
workers to work with clients they may otherwise reject, to hesitate when considering
whether to inform police officers about a violent encounter, or to refuse medical
treatment for fear of judgment by medical professionals for engaging in illegal
activities.294 This increases the amount of violence that occurs in the community
because the sex workers cannot seek assistance when they have violent
encounters.295
The social harms from prostitution largely stem from its criminalization. The
fear of criminalization does not result in decreased entry into the trade.296 Instead,
criminalization often results in stigma, social marginalization, and isolation that
further increase the harms that sex workers experience.297 The stigma resulting from
the criminalization of sex work has been shown to result in sex workers being less
willing to consult police officers.298 Sex workers have similarly been less willing to
seek medical treatment or engage in preventative services because they fear the risk

experiences of violence, in part because regular clients have avoided them for fear
of police harassment and arrest, turning instead to the internet and indoor venues
for sex. Sex workers have reported fewer clients on strolls, and those that remain
are more likely to be drunk, violent, and to request unprotected sex. The
phenomenon of increasing violence against sex workers following anti-client
measures has also been noted in other jurisdictions. In Sweden, the decline in
client numbers on strolls has also meant greater competition for clients and lower
prices . . . .
Chu & Glass, supra note 286, at 106 (citations omitted).
292
Id.
Sweden’s mainstreaming of radical feminism appears, therefore, to be used to
justify a law that has resulted in the policing and moralizing of public space,
ridding Sweden of the perceived aesthetic and social blight of prostitution by
displacing visible prostitution, while Sweden postures as a progressive state that
recognizes prostitution as a form of violence [when it has merely displaced sex
work] . . . .
Jay Levy & Pye Jakobsson, Sweden’s Abolitionist Discourse and Law: Effects on the
Dynamics of Swedish Sex Work and on the Lives of Sweden’s Sex Workers, 14 CRIMINOLOGY
& CRIM. JUST. 593, 598 (2014).
293
See Chu & Glass, supra note 286, at 106.
294
Id. at 107.
295
Id. at 106.
296
Id.
297
Id. at 105–07 (describing the social harms sex workers experience from the
criminalization of prostitution).
298
See Chu & Glass, supra note 286, at 106.
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associated with being honest about their work.299 Research shows that sex workers
experience an incredible degree of social marginalization because of the
criminalization of sex work.300 “The ability to operate legally, even with restrictions,
means prostitution is less covert and less motivated to seek ‘protection’ through
corrupt or illegal associations. Sex workers can seek redress against exploitation or
poor work conditions without exposing themselves to criminal charges, or to
criminal pay-back.”301
In addition, sex workers often face collateral consequences for criminal records
associated with prostitution. They wear their prior convictions as an unending
consequence of criminalization, much like others who experience the harms of mass
incarceration.302 They are often cycled in and out of prison and are targeted through
police profiling and broken windows policing strategies. 303 Much of the current
rationales for continued criminalization of sex work are connected to the presumed
victim status of sex workers. The retributivist turn in criminal law has legitimized
the system as a proper forum for meting out benevolent forms of punishment where
victims obtain social goods through criminalization. Yet, these presumed victims are
the primary victims of the very criminal legal system that is intended to be serving
their interests. 304 These victims are usually from marginalized groups that have
historically been the subjects of mass incarceration.305 If we have moved beyond the
criminalization of sexual conduct merely because it is unsavory or out of alignment
with our social mores in other arenas, what is the true rationale for criminalizing
consensual sex that ends with the signing of a check? The only plausible answer is
the adherence to use the criminal legal system as a forum for assigning blame, even
for minor offenses.

299
See Christine Harcourt et al., The Decriminalisation of Prostitution is Associated
with Better Coverage of Health Promotion Programs for Sex Workers, 34 AUSTRALIAN &
N.Z. J. PUB. HEALTH 482 (2010) (finding that the decriminalization of sex work was
associated with better health programs for sex workers).
300
Id.
301
Christine Harcourt et al., Sex Work and the Law, 2 SEXUAL HEALTH 121, 126 (2005).
302
See Sienna Baskin et al., Criminal Laws on Sex Work and HIV Transmission:
Mapping the Laws, Considering the Consequences, 93 DENV. L. REV. 355, 360 (2016)
(“These consequences include limitations on employment options, discrimination by
employers, loss of access to public benefits—including public housing—and loss of the right
to sue the police if they are victims of police violence. In some states, sex workers who have
prior convictions of prostitution and are arrested again are subject to felony charges and
mandatory jail time.” (citations omitted)).
303
See generally Frankie Herrmann, Building a Fair and Just New York: Decriminalize
Transactional Sex, 15 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 51 (2018) (discussing the role of
broken windows theory in demonizing sex workers).
304
See generally Brendan M. Conner, In Loco Aequitatis: The Dangers of “Safe
Harbor” Laws for Youth in the Sex Trades, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 43 (2016) (describing
the ways in which “safe harbor” laws intended to protect trafficking victims can lead to a
net-widening effect that increases arrests and harassment for prostitution).
305
See generally id.
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The criminalization of sex work does not appear to serve a legitimate purpose
insofar as it is intended to protect sex workers from themselves.306 As centuries of
failed regulation show, nothing has successfully eliminated entry into the profession.
Moreover, in jurisdictions where sex work has been decriminalized, sex workers
have experienced greater positive outcomes.307 In New Zealand, sex workers have
experienced decreased levels of violence, improved health, and better relationships
with the police following decriminalization.308 Even the criminalization of the sex
work client has been shown to have a marginalization effect on sex workers.309 The
hope was that criminalizing the actions of the sex work client while decriminalizing
the actions of the sex worker would improve outcomes for the sex worker while
signaling that sex work was not tolerated. 310 However, in Sweden, sex workers
report experiencing increased social isolation, violence, and damaged relationships
with the police once the government decided to criminalize the conduct of their
clients. 311 Once part of the sex work transaction is criminalized, the entire
transaction is impacted.
Criminalization is a powerful tool for deeming an act undesirable. 312 Joel
Feinberg has argued that criminal law serves an expressive function, in establishing
moral conduct and what society is willing to accept.313 This is certainly the case with
prostitution. 314 Society is expressing disapproval of those who are willing to
entertain the commodification of sex even where only part of the transaction is

306

Mary Joe Frug has described the ways that discriminatory law enforcement practices
demonstrate the harms of criminalization:
Anti-prostitution rules terrorize the female body. The regulation of
prostitution is accomplished not only by rules that expressly repress or prohibit
commercialized sex. Prostitution regulation also occurs through a network of
cultural practices that endanger sex workers’ lives and make their work terrifying.
These practices include the random, demeaning, and sometimes brutal character
of anti-prostitution law enforcement.
Mary Joe Frug, Commentary, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (an Unfinished
Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1992).
307
See, e.g., Harcourt et al., supra note 301; Gillian M. Abel, A Decade of
Decriminalization: Sex Work ‘Down Under’ But Not Underground, 14 CRIMINOLOGY &
CRIM. JUST. 580, 581 (2014) (“Decriminalization in New Zealand has seen many positive
changes for sex workers with robust evidence to suggest that it is a regulatory environment
that should be seriously considered in other parts of the world.” (citations omitted)).
308
See Abel, supra note 307, at 583–87 (discussing a wide range of positive outcomes
due to the decriminalization of prostitution in New Zeeland).
309
Chu & Glass, supra note 286, at 113.
310
Id. at 111.
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Id. at 105–06.
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See Feinberg, supra note 38, at 75–76.
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Id. at 75.
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See Chu & Glass, supra 286, at 111–12.
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criminalized.315 Criminalization allows for the quiet and not-so-quiet judgment of
those who dare to deviate from the dominant societal sexual mores. 316 There is
considerable research showing that sex workers experienced heightened
marginalization and stigma from their activities. 317 It is counterproductive to
contribute to this stigma by making their conduct criminal when the intent is to save
them from themselves or the social harms of trafficking.318 The expressive function
of the criminal law should aim to empower victims, not to further marginalize them
or punish them for being outsiders. The question then becomes whether this
disapproval is permissible and whether the criminal legal system should be the
primary system for expressing societal disapproval.
After all, the decision to crackdown on particular forms of moral conduct is not
driven by a calculated risk of what is most harmful to the community.319 It is often
driven by the whims of an executive officer who has exercised discrection in a
manner that dictates social norms as that person sees fit.320 A stricter analysis before
the passage of a new law allows the legislature to put a check on executive discretion
and better ensure that the criminal legal system is functioning without unduly
harming society.321
Decriminalization may also improve public health. 322 Research shows that
decriminalization is better able to serve public health goals.323 Those communities
that have decriminalized sex work have improved sex worker public health
outcomes.324 Sex workers feel more comfortable going to health providers about

315

Id.
Id. at 102
317
See generally id.(exploring how criminalization of sex workers and their clients in
Sweden has contributed to anti-prostitution stigma and marginalization that dissuades sex
workers from seeking health care and reporting violence).
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See Gruber et al., supra note 5, at 1336 (stating that both sides of argument agree
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See Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 33 (2017) (describing how
enforcement of the law is driven by executive discretion and defining crackdowns as “an
executive decision to intensify the severity of enforcement of existing regulations or laws as
to a selected class of offenders or a selected set of offenses”).
320
Id.
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Cf. Stuntz, supra note 16, at 511–12 (discussing how broad discretion has given
members of the executive branch, prosecutors, the ability to act as mini-legislators).
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But see I. India Thusi, Policing Sex: The Colonial, Apartheid, and New Democracy
Policing of Sex Work in South Africa, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 205, 206–07 (2015); Priscilla
Alexander, Prostitution: Still a Difficult Issue for Feminists, in SEX WORK: WRITING BY
WOMEN IN THE INDUSTRY 184, 211 (Frédérique Delacoste & Priscilla Alexander eds., 2d ed.
1998) (noting that “although some epidemiologists like to claim that prostitutes are a
‘reservoir of contagion’ or a ‘core group of high frequency transmitters,’ in the United States,
less than 5% of STDs are associated with prostitution . . . .”).
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Harcourt et al., supra note 301, at 482.
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their concerns. 325 They also do not face the threat of having condoms seized as
evidence of prostitution326 nor do they feel compelled to take undesirable clients out
of desperation.327
C. Community Distribution
The next question is how the harms of criminalization and sex work are
distributed amongst various community members. The community may experience
some harms in the form of public nuisance violations in the case of street-based sex
work. The criminalization of sex work is a rather recent invention and sex work was
only a concern to the extent it resulted in a public nuisance violation. 328 The
government only sought to intervene to maintain public order and to discourage
nuisance.329 This is a legitimate community interest, but public nuisances may be
addressed without criminalization.330 There is the possibility of regulation in some
communities, with particular protections to ensure that other interests are
considered. There may be time, place, and manner restrictions or regulation that
dictates the manners in which it may occur. There are many government tools
available that may address this community concern, including zoning restrictions,
licenses, and public nuisance regulations.331
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The distribution of the harm from sex work and criminalization is heavily
weighted toward the sex workers. However, in the case of other less serious crimes,
the distributive analysis would require careful examination of the various public
health goals, an analysis of the various communities involved, and a careful
balancing of the competing interests. In the case of prostitution, after considering
the various harms at stake as well as the empirical evidence, it is clear that
criminalization is unable to improve sex worker well-being or community health and
safety.
CONCLUSION
Our criminal legal system is causing more harm than good. The United States
is incarcerating people at an unprecedented rate, racial disparities abound at every
level of the system, and there is little sign we can return to more reasonable
incarceration levels without serious interventions. Retributivist arguments about
punishment for the sake of punishment have been the normative fuel for justifying
this massive expansion of the criminal legal system. Retributivism has facilitated the
incorporation of implicit biases in the system by relying on abstract determinations
about blameworthiness that are infected with the judgers’ own biases. Women of
color are often perceived as more blameworthy, and their bodies and communities
are policed because of the blame that has been assigned to them.
This Article seeks to improve the system by providing an alternative approach
for examining whether conduct should be criminalized. Distributive
consequentialism provides a normative framework for empowering those most
affected by the criminalization of conduct and creates a presumption against
criminalization. Rather than relying on indeterminate judgments about individuals’
blameworthiness, it engages in an empirical analysis of what criminalization
actually does. The harm of criminalization is a relevant consideration in examining
whether criminalization is the most appropriate government intervention for
addressing undesirable conduct. It considers the experiences of people with
intersectional identities and presumes that criminal intervention is to be avoided, not
expanded.
In the case of prostitution, criminalization has been largely ineffective in
addressing the harms of the sex trade, and the distributive consequentialist approach
considers this fact relevant. 332 Sex workers often turn to their work because of
332

Chi Adanna Mgbako et al., The Case for Decriminalization of Sex Work in South
Africa, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1423, 1434 (2013).
Because all other actors in the sex work industry are criminalized, sex workers
remain “guilty by association” and vulnerable to police harassment. For example,
in order to gather evidence against clients, police subject sex workers to
questioning and intrusive searches. Sex workers can also be forced to testify
against clients at trial.
Id.
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limited economic potential in other forms of labor. And the harms of criminalization
include increased violence, negative health outcomes, and stigmatization. The
retributivist impulse does not consider these facts as relevant and instead focuses on
abstract notions of morality. We should abandon the retributivist impulse, which
assigns blame and judgment, for an approach that actually improves the lives of the
people we hope to protect. By proposing a theory of criminalization that can prevent
the creation of new unnecessary criminal laws and assist the decriminalization of
current existing laws, this Article provides a normative tool for addressing the
current crisis in the criminal legal system.

